Part 5: Miscellaneous Topics [220] ============================ [NB. this part is seriously incomplete.] Contents -------- 5.1 Nativism (Chomsky, etc) [27] 5.2 Modularity/Perceptual Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [15] 5.3 Mental Images (Pylyshyn, Kosslyn) [25] 5.4 Rationality [16] 5.5 Animal Cognition [7] 5.6 Color, General [27] 5.7 Phenomenal Qualities and the Sorites Paradox [7] 5.8 Sensation and Perception, Misc [9] 5.9 Pain and Pleasure [15] 5.10 Emotions, etc [6] 5.11 Dreaming [7] 5.12 Free Will (tiny selection) [15] 5.13 Interactionist Dualism [11] 5.14 Split Brains [12] 5.15 Personal Identity (tiny selection) [11] 5.16 Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc [10] 5.1 Nativism (Chomsky, etc) [27] --------------------------- Atherton, M. & Schwarz, R. 1974. Linguistic innateness and its evidence. Journal of Philosophy 71:6. Chomsky, N. 1967. Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas. Synthese 17:2-11. Chomsky, N. 1969. Linguistics and philosophy. In (S. Hook, ed) _Language and Philosophy_. New York University Press. Reply to Putnam 1967: Putnam underestimates complexity of grammar, etc. Chomsky, N. 1975. On cognitive capacity. In _Reflections on Language_. Pantheon Books. Chomsky, N. 1980. Discussion of Putnam's comments. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. Chomsky, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1980. The inductivist fallacy. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. Harman, G. 1969. Linguistic competence and empiricism. In (S. Hook, ed) _Language and Philosophy_. New York University Press. Fodor, J.A., Bever, T. & Garrett, M. 1974. The specificity of language skills. In _The Psychology of Language_. McGraw-Hill. Fodor, J.A. 1980. Reply to Putnam. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. Katz, J. 1966. Innate ideas. In _The Philosophy of Language_. Harper & Row. Overview; poverty of stimulus, unobservable features => rationalism. Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (ed) 1980. _Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. An excellent collection of papers & responses by Piaget, Chomsky and others. Putnam, H. 1967. The `Innateness Hypothesis' and explanatory models in linguistics. Synthese 17:12-22. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Contra nativism: disputes (1) surprising universals (2) explanation of universals (3) ease of learning (4) relevance of IQ-independence. Putnam, H. 1980. What is innate and why. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. Putnam, H. 1980. Comments on Chomsky's and Fodor's replies. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. Sampson, G. 1978. Linguistic universals as evidence for empiricism. Journal of Linguistics. Explain universals via Popper/Simon empirical model. Stich, S.P. (ed) 1975. _Innate Ideas_. University of California Press. Stich, S.P. 1979. Between Chomskian rationalism and Popperian empiricism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30:329-47. Can take middle ground. Anti-empiricism doesn't imply rationalism. Churchland, P.S. 1978. Fodor on language learning. Synthese 38:149-59. Fodor, J.A. 1981. The present status of the innateness controversy. In _Representations_. MIT Press. Concepts are undefinable, so primitive, so innate (plus gloss). Fodor, J.A. 1980. On the impossibility of acquiring `more powerful' structures. In (M. Piattelli-Palmarini, ed) _Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky_. Harvard University Press. Mehler, J. & Fox, R. (eds) 1985. _Neonate Cognition: Beyond the Blooming Buzzing Confusion_. Erlbaum. Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1986. The rise of selective theories: A case study and some lessons from immunology. In (W. Demopoulos, ed) _Language Learning and Concept Acquisition_. Ablex. Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1989. Evolution, selection, and cognition: From learning to parameter setting in biology and in the study of language. Cognition 31:1-44. Why learning is selective and not instructive. Biological analogies, linguistic evidence. Dispense with "learning" as a scientific term. Ramsey, W. & Stich, S.P. 1990. Connectionism and three levels of nativism. Synthese 82:177-205. Identifies minimal nativism vs anti-empiricism vs rationalism. Considers the relevance of connx networks. Some arguments for nativism may survive. Samet, J. 1986. Troubles with Fodor's nativism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:575-594. Concepts can be acquired without being learned by symbol-manipulation. Samet, J. & Flanagan, O.J. 1989. Innate representations. In (S. Silvers, ed) _Rerepresentation_. Kluwer. Sterelny, K. 1989. Fodor's nativism. Philosophical Studies 55:119-41. Fodor is wrong and silly too. 5.2 Perception/Modularity/Plasticity (Fodor, Churchland) [15] -------------------------------------------------------- Arbib, M. 1989. Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor. In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_. Kluwer. Against Fodor: modules are smaller, interact strongly, not domain-specific. Bennett, L. 1990. Modularity of mind revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41:429-36. Remarks on Shanon and Fodor. Bruner, J. 1957. On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review 65:14-21. Overview of the original studies on top-down effects in perception. Churchland, P.M. 1979. _Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind_. Cambridge University Press. Our perception is deeply theory-laden, and potentially very plastic. Churchland, P.M. 1988. Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science 55:167-87. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Contra Fodor 1984: observation is theory-laden (built-in or not); supported by neurophysiological evidence; perceptual systems have long-term plasticity. Fodor, J.A. 1983. _The Modularity of Mind_. MIT Press. Perception happens in informationally encapsulated, domain-specific modules. Central systems aren't encapsulated, and so may be impossible to understand. Fodor, J.A. 1985. Precis of _The modularity of mind_. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:1-42. Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990). Summary of MOM (with commentary and reply in the BBS printing). Fodor, J.A. 1986. The modularity of mind. In (Z. Pylyshyn, ed) _Meaning and Cognitive Structure_. Ablex. Informal discussion of modularity. With commentaries by Fahlman, Caplan. Fodor, J.A. 1984. Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51:23-43. Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990). Argues for an observation/theory distinction, and against belief affecting perception. Fodor, J.A. 1988. A reply to Churchland's `Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality'. Philosophy of Science 55:188-98. Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990). Churchland is up the creek without a paddle. Fodor, J.A. 1989. Why should the mind be modular? In (A. George, ed) _Reflections on Chomsky_. Blackwell. Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990). Garfield, J. (ed) 1987. _Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding_. MIT Press. A collection of papers on modularity in language and vision. Ross, J. 1990. Against postulating central systems in the mind. Philosophy of Science 57:297-312. Fodor's arguments for unencapsulated central systems are no good; AI is possible after all. Shanon, B. 1988. Remarks on the modularity of mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39:331-52. Criticism of Fodor. Modularity is dynamic, and can be central. Fodor, J.A. & Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1981. How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson's `ecological approach'. Cognition 9:139-96. `Direct perception' can't correspond to anything. Perception is inferential. 5.3 Mental Imagery [25] ------------------ Block, N. (ed) 1981. _Imagery_. MIT Press. Block, N. 1983. Mental pictures and cognitive science. Philosophical Review 93:499-542. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Block, N. 1983. The photographic fallacy in the debate about mental imagery. Nous 17:651-62. Brown, R. & Herrstein, R. 1981. Icons and images. In (N. Block, ed) _Imagery_. MIT Press. Cam, P. 1987. Propositions about images. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:335-8. Dennett, D.C. 1978. Two approaches to mental images. In _Brainstorms_. MIT Press. Dennett, D.C. 1968. The nature of images and the introspective trap. In _Content and Consciousness_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Fodor, J.A. 1975. Imagistic representation. In _The Language of Thought_. Harvard University Press. Kosslyn, S.M. & Pomerantz, J. 1977. Imagery, propositions and the form of internal representations. Cognitive Psychology 9:52-76. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Kosslyn, S.M. 1981. The medium and the message in mental imagery: A theory. In (N. Block, ed) _Imagery_. MIT Press. Kosslyn, S.M., Pinker, S., Schwartz, S. & Smith, G. 1979. On the demystification of mental imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2:535-81. Kosslyn, S.M. 1980. _Image and Mind_. Harvard University Press. Maloney, J.C. 1984. Mental images and cognitive theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 21:237-47. Mortensen, C. 1989. Mental images: Should cognitive science learn from neurophysiology? In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_. Kluwer. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1973. What the mind's eye tells the mind's brain: A critique of mental imagery. Psych Bull 80:1-24. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1978. Imagery and artificial intelligence. In (W. Savage, ed) _Perception and Cognition_. University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1981. The imagery debate: Analog media vs. tacit knowledge. In (N. Block, ed) _Imagery_. MIT Press. Rey, G. 1981. What are mental images? In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 2. Harvard University Press. Russow, L. 1985. Dennett, mental images and images in context. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:581-94. Schwartz, R. 1980. Imagery: There is more to it than meets the eye. Philosophy of Science Association. Shepard, R. & Cooper, L. 1982. _Mental Images and their Transformations_. MIT Press. Sterelny, K. 1986. The imagery debate. Philosophy of Science 53:560-83. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Tye, M. 1984. The debate about mental imagery. Journal of Philosophy 81:678-91. Tye, M. 1988. The picture theory of images. Philosophical Review. Tye, M. 1991. _The Imagery Debate_. MIT Press, 5.4 Rationality [16] --------------- Cherniak, C. 1986. _Minimal Rationality_. MIT Press. People are not perfectly rational, but just rational enough to get by. Cherniak, C. 1981. Minimal rationality. Mind 90:161-83. Cherniak, C. 1983. Rationality and the structure of memory. Synthese 57:163-86. Cohen, L. 1979. On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? Cognition 7:385-407. Cohen, L. 1980. Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Cognition 8:89-92. Cohen, L. 1981. Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences. There's no irrationality, just performance errors in a rational competence. Experimental results are either (1) cognitive illusions; (2) insufficient education; or (3) experimenter error. With commentaries (mostly negative). Cohen, L. 1986. _The Dialogue of Reason_. Cambridge University Press. Fetzer, J. 1990. Evolution, rationality and testability. Synthese 82:423-39. Harman, G. 1986. _Change in View_. MIT Press. On how people update their beliefs. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (eds) 1982. _Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases_. Cambridge University Press. Empirical evidence on imperfect reasoning; 35 papers. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. 1979. On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen. Cognition 7:409-11. Manktelow, K. & Over, D. 1987. Reasoning and rationality. Mind and Language 2:199-219. Nisbett, R. & Ross, L. 1980. _Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment_. Prentice-Hall. Rust, J. 1990. Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology. Implications of psychiatric delusions for cognitive science. Stich, S.P. 1985. Could man be an irrational animal? Synthese 64:115-35. Wason, P. 1966. Reasoning. In (Foss, ed) _New Horizons in Psychology_. Penguin. On the Wason four-card selection task. 5.5 Animal Cognition [7] -------------------- Davidson, D. 1982. Rational animals. Dialectica 36:317-28. Dennett, D.C. 1983. Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The `Panglossian paradigm' defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:343-90. Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT Press, 1987). Can we attribute higher-order beliefs etc to animals? Use the experimental method. With some remarks on adaptationism. Dennett, D.C. 1989. Cognitive ethology: Hunting for bargains or a wild goose chase? In (Montefiore, ed) _Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals_. Unwin Hyman. More on vervet monkeys. Links between ethology and AI. Nelson, J. 1983. Do animals propositionally know? Do they propositionally believe? American Philosophical Quarterly 20:149-60. Routley, R. 1982. Alleged problems in attributing beliefs, and intentionality, to animals. Inquiry 24:385-417. Sterelny, K. 1990. Animals and individualism. In (P. Hanson, ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_. University of British Columbia Press. Stich, S.P. 1978. Do animals have beliefs? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57:15-28. If they do, we can't ascribe content to them. 5.6 Color, General [27] -- see also 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 5.7 ------------------ Hardin, C.L. 1988. _Color for Philosophers_. Hackett. Everything about brain-processing of color, and how it bears on philosophical problems. Armstrong, D.M. 1969. Colour realism and the argument from microscopes. In (R. Brown & C. Rollins, eds) _Contemporary Philosophy in Australia_. Humanities Press. Averill, E.W. 1985. Color and the anthropocentric problem. Journal of Philosophy 82:281-303. Variation in shade distinctions under lights forces hard choices re color. Boghossian, P. & Velleman, J.D. 1991. Physicalist theories of color. Philosophical Review 100:67-106. Campbell, K. 1969. Colours. In (R. Brown & C. Rollins, eds) _Contemporary Philosophy in Australia_. Humanities Press. Campbell, K. 1982. The implications of Land's theory of colour vision. In (L. Cohen, ed) _Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science_, Vol. 6. North-Holland. Hardin, C.L. 1983. Colors, normal observers and standard conditions. Journal of Philosophy 80:806-13. Appeal to standard conditions doesn't work as a definition of color terms. Hardin, C.L. 1984. A new look at color. American Philosophical Quarterly 21:125-33. Hardin, C.L. 1984. Are scientific objects colored? Mind 93:491-500. Hardin, C.L. 1985. The resemblances of colors. Philosophical Studies 48:35-47. Color is analyzable, in hue circle terms. Contra Armstrong. Hardin, C.L. 1985. Frank talk about the colors of sense-data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93. Hardin, C.L. 1989. Could white be green? Mind 390:285-8. Hilbert, D. 1987. _Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism_. CSLI. Johnston, M. 1992. How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies 68:221-263. Argues that various competing positions about color are all true, but some are better than others. In particular, defends a dispositional secondary quality view against primary quality views. Nice. McGilvray, J. 1983. To color. Synthese 54:37-70. Smith, P. 1987. Subjectivity and colour vision. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:245-81. On colors as dispositions to produce certain internal states. Against a Nagelian conception of color, pro a scientific realist one. Thompson, E., Palacios, A., & Varela, F.J. 1992. Ways of coloring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Westphal, J. 1987. _Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein_. Blackwell. Westphal, J. 1988. White. Mind 97:310-28. Wittgenstein, L. 1977. _Remarks on Colour_. University of California Press. Crane, H. & Pintanida, T.P. 1983. On seeing reddish green and yellowish blue. Science 221:1078-80. Kenner, C. 1965. The triviality of the red/green problem. Analysis 25:147-53. Putnam, H. 1956. Reds, greens and logical analysis. Philosophical Review 65:206-17. Pap, A. 1957. Once more: Colors and the synthetic a priori. Philosophical Review 66:94-99. Putnam, H. 1957. Red and green all over again: Rejoinder to Pap. Philosophical Review 100-103. Radford, C. 1965. Incompatibilities of colour. Philosophical Quarterly 15:207-19. Remnant, P. 1961. Red and green all over again. Analysis 21:93-95. 5.7 Phenomenal Qualities and the Sorites Paradox [7] ------------------------------------------------ Goodman, N. 1977. _The Structure of Appearance_. D. Reidel. Qualia A = qualia B iff they match precisely the same C's. Burgess, J.A. 1990. Phenomenal qualities and the nontransitivity of matching. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Dummett, M. 1975. Wang's paradox. Synthese 30:391-24. Goodman's notion => phenomenal qualities are physical qualities => no no no. Dummett, M. 1979. Common sense and physics. In (G. Macdonald, ed) _Perception and Identity_. Macmillan. Linsky, B. 1984. The identity of indistinguishables. Synthese 59:363-80. Parikh, R. 1983. The problem of vague predicates. In (R. Cohen & W. Wartofsky, eds) _Language, Logic and Method_. D. Reidel. Travis, C. 1985. Vagueness, observation and Sorites. Mind 94:345-66. 5.8 Sensation and Perception, Misc [8] ---------------------------------- Dretske, F. 1979. Simple seeing. In (D. Gustafson & B. Tapscott, eds) _Body, Mind and Method_. Kluwer. About causal theories of seeing. Jacquette, D. 1984. Sensation and intentionality. Philosophical Studies 47:229-40. Sensations don't have intentional objects, they *are* intentional objects. Lahav, R. 1990. An alternative to the adverbial theory: Dis-phenomenalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50. Objects of experience are objects, not adverbs; just have to do it right. Leon, M. 1988. Characterising the senses. Mind and Language 3:243-70. Nelkin, N. 1990. Categorizing the senses. Mind and Language. Maloney, J.C. 1986. Sensation and scientific realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46:471-82. Maloney, J.C. 1986. Sensuous content. Philosophical Papers 15:131-54. Pendlebury, M. 1990. Sense experiences and their contents: A defense of the propositional account. Inquiry 33:215-30. Lots of reasons why sense experiences have propositional content. 5.9 Pain and Pleasure [14] --------------------- Conee, E. 1984. A defense of pain. Philosophical Studies 46:239-48. Cowan, J. 1968. _Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology_. Macmillan. Dennett, D.C. 1978. Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese 38. Reprinted in _Brainstorms_ (MIT Press, 1978). Edwards, R. 1975. Do pleasures and pains differ qualitatively? Journal of Value Inquiry 9:270-81. Gillett, G. 1991. The neurophilosophy of pain. Philosophy 66:191-206. Relating the neurophysiology of pain to a Wittgensteinian account. Pain is a complex of reactions, not inner information. Goldstein, I. 1989. Pleasure and pain: unconditional intrinsic values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Graham, G. & Stephens, G. 1987. Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible qualities. Nous 21:395-405. Kaufman, R. 1985. Is the concept of pain incoherent? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:279-84. Momeyer, R. 1975. Is pleasure a sensation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36:113-21. Nelkin, N. 1986. Pains and pain sensations. Journal of Philosophy 83:129-48. Pain sensation is not pain. Pain is an attitude. Empirical studies, etc. Nelkin, N. 1993. Reconsidering pains. Philosophical Psychology. Argues that pains are a combination of a phenomenal state with an immediate evaluation of that state as harmful; no *particular* phenomenal type is required. With application to empirical cases. Newton, N. 1989. On viewing pain as a secondary quality. Nous 23:569-98. Pitcher, G. 1970. The awfulness of pain. Journal of Philosophy 48. Quinn, W. 1968. Pleasure -- disposition or episode? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28:578-86. Rachlin, H. 1985. Pain and behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:43-83. 5.10 Emotions, etc [6] ------------------ Davis, W. 1981. A theory of happiness. American Philosophical Quarterly 18:111-20. Griffiths, P. 1989. Folk, functional and neurochemical aspects of mood. Philosophical Psychology 2:17-32. Lormand, E. 1985. Toward a theory of moods. Philosophical Studies 47:385-407. Moods are not intentional states, but rather modulate the activity of intentional states such as beliefs and desires. Criticizes other theories. Marks, J. 1982. A theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 42:227-42. Rey, G. 1980. Functionalism and emotion. In (A. Rorty, ed), _Explaining the Emotions_. University of California Press. Rorty, A. (ed) 1980. _Explaining the Emotions_. University of California Press. 5.11 Dreaming [7] ------------- Ayer, A. 1960. Professor Malcolm on dreams. Journal of Philosophy. Dennett, D.C. 1976. Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review 73:151-71. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). Hunter, J. 1983. The difference between dreaming and being awake. Mind 92:80-93. Malcolm, N. 1962. _Dreaming_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Malcolm, N. 1956. Dreaming and skepticism. Philosophical Review 45:14-37. Putnam, H. 1962. Dreaming and `depth grammar'. In (R. Butler, ed) _Analytical Philosophy: First Series_. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Shanon, B. 1983. Descartes' puzzle -- An organismic approach. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:185-95. 5.12 Free Will (a tiny selection) [15] --------------------------------- Churchland, P.S. 1981. Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 90:99-101. Argues with Popper/Eccles. Determinism isn't self-refuting any more than anti-vitalism is self-refuting on the grounds that proponents must be dead. Dennett, D.C. 1984. _Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting_. MIT Press. Nice analysis of the various `bugbears' of determinism; stuff on "control", "could have done otherwise", and "self-made selves". Eccles, J. 1976. Brain and free will. In (G. Globus, ed) _Consciousness and the Brain_. Plenum Press. If opinions are not free but forced, then they are not worth taking seriously. Thus determinism undermines itself. Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 65:829-39. Ginet, C. 1983. In defence of incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 44:391-400. Goldman, A. 1968. Actions, predictions, and books of life. American Philosophical Quarterly. Honderich, T. (ed) 1973. _Essays on Freedom of Action_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Morden, M. 1990. Free will, self-causation, and strange loops. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68:59-73. Uses Hofstadter's strange loops to support a thesis about free will: I am free (enough) when I am a cause of my own behavior. Popper, K. 1983. Is determinism self-refuting? Mind 92:103-4. Churchland misstates the case. Slote, M. 1980. Understanding free will. Journal of Philosophy 77:136-51. Slote, M. 1982. Selective necessity and free will. Journal of Philosophy 74:5-24. van Inwagen, P. 1983. _An Essay on Free Will_. Oxford University Press. Watson, G. (ed) 1982. _Free Will_. Oxford University Press. Wolf, S. 1980. Asymmetrical freedom. Journal of Philosophy 77:151-66. Wolf, S. 1981. The importance of free will. Mind 90:366-78. 5.13 Interactionist Dualism [11] --------------------------- Averill, E.W. & Keating, B. 1981. Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind 90:102-7. Interactionism is compatible with conservation of energy and momentum: the mind exerts a non-physical force on the brain. Bricke, J. 1975. Interaction and physiology. Mind 84:255-9. Evans, S. 1981. Separable souls: A defense of minimal dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19. Larmer, R. 1986. Mind-Body interactionism and the conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26:277-85. Various arguments about interactionism based on conservation of energy. C of E only applies to causally isolated systems, so objections beg the question. Lowe, E.J. 1992. The problem of psychophysical causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70:263-76. Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior. Popper, K. & Eccles, J. 1977. _The Self and Its Brain_. Springer. Popper, K. 1977. Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Sussman, A. 1981. Reflection on the chances for a scientific dualism. Journal of Philosophy 78:95-118. Dualism is an empty hypothesis. Everything must be matter, though we may have to expand the notion of matter. Richardson, R.C. 1982. The `scandal' of Cartesian dualism. Mind 91:20-37. Taliaferro, C. 1986. A modal argument for dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:95-108. Wassermann, G. 19xx. Reply to Popper's attack on epiphenomenalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 5.14 Split Brains [12] ----------------- Gazzaniga, M. 1977. On dividing the self: Speculations from brain research. Excerpta Medica: Neurology 434:233-44. Gillett, G. 1986. Brain bisection and personal identity. Mind 95:224-9. Neuro facts plus Wittg analysis => Parfit's conclusions aren't secure. Hirsch, E. 1991. Divided minds. Philosophical Review 1:3-30. Dividing a brain doesn't give stream-reflexive knowledge and control (so, contra Parfit, couldn't have one half doing algebra and the other geometry). Johnston, M. 1989. Fission and the facts. Philosophical Perspectives 3:369-97. Marks, C. 1980. Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind_. MIT Press. Nagel, T. 1971. Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese 22:396-413. Reprinted in _Mortal Questions_ (Cambridge University Press, 1979). Parfit, D. 1984. _Reasons and Persons_. Oxford University Press. No further facts over physical facts. Puccetti, R. 1973. Brain bisection and personal identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24:339-55. Puccetti, R. 1981. The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:93-123. Robinson, D. 1976. What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at split-brain man. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27:73-8. Sperry, R. 1984. Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain. Neuropsychologia 22:611-73. Wilkes, K.V. 1978. Consciousness and commissurotomy. Philosophy 53:185-99. 5.15 Personal Identity (a tiny random selection) [11] ------------------------------------------------ Biro, J.I. 1981. Persons as corporate entities and corporations as persons. Nature and System 3:173-80. Brooks, D. 1986. Group minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:456-70. Lots of fun speculation on group minds. Lewis, D. 1976. Survival and identity. In (A. Rorty, ed) _The Identities of Persons_. University of California Press. Nozick, R. 1981. The identity of the self. In _Philosophical Explanations_. Harvard University Press. Lots of puzzle cases; defence of the closest-continuer theory; and the role of reflexivity and self-synthesis. Parfit, D. 1971. Personal identity. Philosophical Review 80:3-27. Parfit, D. 1984. _Reasons and Persons_. Oxford University Press. Exhaustive analysis toward a reductionist conclusion. Perry, J. 1975. _Personal Identity_. University of California Press. Rorty, A. (ed) 1976. _The Identities of Persons_. University of California Press. Wilkes, K.V. 1988. _Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments_. Oxford University Press. Analysis of real cases, e.g. multiple personality & split brains, as thought experiments are too misleading. Zuboff, A. 1978. Moment universals and personal identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:141-55. We are connected to infinitely many pasts and futures. Depressing? Zuboff, A. 1990. One self: The logic of experience. Inquiry 33:39-68. We are all the same person. A statistical argument for first universalizing across tokens, and then across types. Autobiographical and entertaining. 5.16 Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Misc [10] ------------------------------------------ Clark, A. 1987. Being there: Why implementation matters to cognitive science. AI Review 1:231-44. On the importance of embodiment of systems in cognition. Foss, J. 1992. Introduction to the epistemology of the brain: Indeterminacy, micro-specificity, chaos, and openness. Topoi 11:45-57. On the brain as a vector-processing system, and the problems raised by indeterminacy, chaos, and so on. With morals for cognitive science. Gilman, D. 1993. Optimization and simplicity: Marr's theory of vision and biological explanation. Manuscript. Contra Kitcher 1988, much of Marr's theory doesn't depend on optimization; in any case, optimization isn't so bad. With remarks on interdisciplinarity. Harnad, S. 1990. Neoconstructivism: A unifying constraint for cognitive science. Kitcher, P.S. 1988. Marr's computational theory of vision. Philosophy of Science 55:1-24. Kukla, A. 1989. Non-empirical issues in psychology. American Psychologist 44:485-94. On the role of non-empirical advances in psychology: e.g. in theory construction, coherence analysis, conceptual innovation, with the aid of logically necessary truths and the contingent/pragmatic a priori. Lloyd, D. 1989. _Simple Minds_. MIT Press. Ramsey, W. 1992. Prototypes and conceptual analysis. Topoi 11:59-70. On the significance of psychological work on concepts for philosophical conceptual analysis -- simple, precise analyses do not exist in general. Rey, G. 1983. Concepts and stereotypes. Cognition 15:237-62. Varela, F.J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. 1991. _The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience_. MIT Press. von Eckhardt, B. 1993. _What is Cognitive Science?_ MIT Press. -- Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, Washington University. (c) 1994 David J. Chalmers.