Part 3: Psychophysical Relations and Psychological Explanation [288] ============================================================== Contents -------- 3.1 Supervenience [54] 3.1a Psychophysical Supervenience (Kim, etc) [7] 3.1b Supervenience and Physicalism [13] 3.1c Technical Issues in Supervenience [11] 3.1d Supervenience, General [23] 3.2 Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [39] 3.3 Reduction [24] 3.4 Token Identity [6] 3.5 Mental Causation [22] 3.6 Psychophysical Relations, Misc [15] 3.7 Functionalism [59] 3.7a Causal Role Functionalism (Armstrong/Lewis) [15] 3.7b Machine Functionalism (Putnam) [16] 3.7c Miscellaneous [28] 3.8 Computationalism [23] 3.9 Psychology and Neuroscience [18] 3.10 Psychological Explanation, Misc [14] 3.11 Philosophy of Mind, General [14] 3.1 Supervenience [54] ----------------- 3.1a Psychophysical Supervenience (Kim, etc) [7] -------------------------------------------- Crane, T. 1991. Why indeed? Papineau on supervenience. Analysis 51:32-7. Contra Papineau 1989: the assumption of completeness is false or trivial. Maybe the mental is part of a complete physics. With response by Papineau. Elugardo, R. 1988. Against weak psychophysical supervenience. Dialectica 42:129-43. Various objections to Kim's arguments for supervenience. Not all internal states relevant to I/O relations are psychological states. Strange. Kim, J. 1979. Causality, identity and supervenience in the mind-body problem. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:31-49. Supervenience of the mental on the physical is what is required to make mental causation possible. Very nice. Kim, J. 1982. Psychophysical supervenience. Philosophical Studies 41:51-70. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Internal mental states (i.e. ones that are not rooted outside) supervene on synchronous internal physical states, and internal states are all that is relevant in the explanation of behavior. Kim, J. 1982. Psychophysical supervenience as a mind-body theory. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:129-47. Distinguishes weak (within-world) vs strong (across-worlds) supervenience. Relates to reduction, internal/external mental states, and various theories. Lewis, H. 1985. Is the mental supervenient on the physical? In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. On some problems with supervenience, the relation between supervenience and reduction, and on reasons for accepting psychophysical supervenience. Loose. Papineau, D. 1989. Why supervenience? Analysis 50:66-71. Psychophysical supervenience follows from completeness of physical laws. 3.1b Supervenience and Physicalism [13] ---------------------------------- Armstrong, D.M. 1982. Metaphysics and supervenience. Critica 42:3-17. Argues that everything is logically supervenient on the physical. Considers classes, possibilities, numbers, universals, and objects of thought. Haugeland, J. 1984. Ontological supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:1-12. Supervenience is all we need for materialism. Various materialist arguments (unity, "nothing but", history, fear of darkness, simplicity, law) don't support physical exhaustion & token identity, over and above supervenience. Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1975. Physicalism: ontology, determination and reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72:551-64. Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1977. Physicalist materialism. Nous 11:321. Hellman, G. 1985. Determination and logical truth. Journal of Philosophy 82:607-16. Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth. Horgan, T. 1981. Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physics. Synthese 49:395-413. Argues that the generality of physics should be a supervenience thesis, not token physicalism. Fodor's token physicalism is untenable but might be saved with an appropriate view of events. Horgan, T. 1982. Supervenience and microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:29-43. An account of how all facts supervene on microphysical facts, and how all intrinsic facts supervene on intrinsic microphysical facts. Horgan, T. 1984. Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:19-38. Laplacean demon's job: number crunching, plus cosmic hermeneutics to explain high-level truths. All high-level truths follow from low-level by meaning constraints. Application to theoretical/mentalistic/everyday terms. Nice. Lewis, D. 1983. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Formulates a definition of materialism: among worlds where no natural properties alien to our worlds are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically. With a lot of other material on universals. Melnyk, A. 1991. Physicalism: From supervenience to elimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:573-87. How can supervenience, as a relationship between ontologically distinct properties, be explained? Modal realism and grand-properties don't work. Eliminativism about supervenient properties is the only possibility. Pettit, P. 1993. A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53:213-23. Defines physicalism in terms of claims that microphysical entities constitute everything and that microphysical laws govern everything. With a reply by Crane. Seager, W.E. 1988. Weak supervenience and materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:697-709. Weak supervenience provides a more tenable form of materialism than strong supervenience, because of inverted spectrum possibilities, etc. Snowdon, P.F. 1989. On formulating materialism and dualism. In (J. Heil, ed) _Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin_. Kluwer. A construal of materialism in terms of constitution, not identity. Discusses the entailment between physical properties and mental properties; considers a nonreductive physicalism and a primitive dualism. 3.1c Technical Issues in Supervenience [11] -------------------------------------- Bacon, J. 1986. Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility. Philosophical Studies 49:163-76. A modal-logic analysis of the relations between various notions of supervenience. Most concepts of supervenience entail necessary co-extension, under certain closure assumptions for properties. Forrest, P. 1988. Supervenience: The grand-property hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:1-12. A nonreductive supervenience hypothesis: supervenient properties are properties of properties, e.g intrinsic goodness is a property of an object's nature. Kim, J. 1984. Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:153-76. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Distinguishes weak and strong supervenience. A mistaken proof that strong and global supervenience are equivalent. Strong supervenience implies a kind of reduction, but not an explanatorily useful reduction. Kim, J. 1987. `Strong' and `global' supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:315-26. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Reasons why global supervenience doesn't entail strong supervenience, and trying to rescue global supervenience as a useful notion. Suggests a similarity-based notion of global supervenience. Kim, J. 1988. Supervenience for multiple domains. Philosophical Topics 16:129-50. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). How properties in one domain can supervene on properties in another, with or without co-ordination between domains. Relation to global supervenience. Marras, A. 1993. Supervenience and reducibility: An odd couple. Philosophical Quarterly 43:215-222. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, as necessary coextension doesn't suffice, and is incompatible with reducibility, due to ontological asymmetry. Moser, P.K. 1992. Physicalism and global supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:71-82. Argues that global supervenience has epistemological problems -- how could we ever know that it holds, and that certain worlds are impossible? Oddie, G. & Tichy, P. 1990. Resplicing properties in the supervenience base. Philosophical Studies 58:259-69. Closure under resplicing makes supervenience both too narrow and too wide. Weak supervenience is generally too weak to capture the dependence relation. Paull, R.C. & Sider, T.R. 1992. In defense of global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:833-53. Gives a proof of the distinction between strong and global supervenience that improves on Petrie's, and argues contra Kim that global supervenience is a perfectly reasonable dependence relation for physicalism. Petrie, B. 1987. Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:119-30. Defending global supervenience: it's weaker than strong supervenience, as base properties of other individuals are relevant. It doesn't entail type or token reducibility. On the relation to implicit definability and reduction. van Cleve, J. 1990. Supervenience and closure. Philosophical Studies 58:225-38. Properties in supervenience relations shouldn't be closed under negation or resplicing, due to bad consequences. With reply by Bacon on resplicing. 3.1d Supervenience, General [23] --------------------------- Blackburn, S. 1984. Supervenience revisited. In (I. Hacking, ed) _Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy_. Cambridge University Press. On the incompatibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience and realism. With discussion of various strengths of necessity involved in supervenience claims, and application to moral realism and anomalous monism. Bonevac, D. 1988. Supervenience and ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25:37-47. On supervenience as a relation between theories. Currie, G. 1984. Individualism and global supervenience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:345-58. How social facts supervene on the totality of individual facts. Application to belief, etc. Grimes, T. 1988. The myth of supervenience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:152-60. Supervenience is too weak to function as a dependency relation, as e.g. it can hold in two directions at once. Grimes, T. 1991. Supervenience, determination, and dependency. Philosophical Studies 62:81-92. On dependency supervenience (B properties determine A properties) versus determination supervenience (A properties need B properties). Hare, R.M. 1984. Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-16. On the universal conditionals that underlie supervenience, and the necessity thereof. A discussion of the necessity of moral, natural kind, and other sorts of supervenience. Contra Davidson, anomalous supervenience is silly. Hellman, G. 1992. Supervenience/determination a two-way street? Yes, but one of the ways is the wrong way! Journal of Philosophy 89:42-47. Reply to Miller 1990. Miller underestimates the modal force of supervenience and invokes irrelevant dispositional properties. Horgan, T. 1993. From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind. An overview of supervenience, with focus on the problem of explaining supervenience relations. With remarks on mental causation, emergence, physicalism, and reduction. Kim, J. 1978. Supervenience and nomological incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:149-56. Developing and motivating the notion of supervenience. Investigating the relationship to reducibility and definability (equivalence, under certain conditions), and to microphysical determination. Kim, J. 1984. Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56. On weak/strong supervenience, and high-level causation via supervenience. Kim, J. 1991. Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy 21:1-27. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). A nice overview of supervenience and covariance. Kim, J. 1993. _Supervenience and Mind_. Cambridge University Press. A collection of articles on supervenience and causation in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, with some added postscripts. Kincaid, H. 1987. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25:343-56. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, which is epistemological. The problem's not just huge disjuncts, but also the sharing of bases, no local correlations, and base-properties presupposing supervenient properties. Kincaid, H. 1988. Supervenience and explanation. Synthese 77:251-81. Argues that lower-level theories can explain supervenient but irreducible higher-level theories, but only under certain conditions, as low-level accounts don't have the relevant kind terms. Klagge, J.C. 1988. Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:461-70. On supervenience as an ontological relation (via metaphysical necessity) or as an ascriptive relation (via conceptual necessity). The first doesn't preclude the second. Moral realism and mental realism are in the same boat. McLaughlin, B.P. 1983. Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91. McLaughlin, B.P. 1994. Varieties of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & O. Yalchin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. On a number of issues: possible worlds vs modal notions, explicating global supervenience, the relation between weak/strong/global supervenience, multiple-domain supervenience, and implications for reduction. Miller, R.B. 1990. Supervenience is a two-way street. Journal of Philosophy 87:695-701. If supervening properties can make arbitrarily fine distinctions, then physical properties supervene on moral/aesthetic/mental properties. Noonan, H. 1987. Supervenience. Philosophical Quarterly 37:78-85. Contra Blackburn 1984 on the possibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience, even with metaphysical necessity; using Nozick's concept structures, or indexical definitions. With application to moral realism. Post, J.F. On the determinacy of valuation. Philosophical Studies 45:315-33. Seager, W.E. 1991. Disjunctive laws and supervenience. Analysis 51:93-98. Teller, P. 1984. The poor man's guide to supervenience and determination. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:137-62. Compares the Hellman/Thompson notion of determination with Kim's development of supervenience. Uses these to investigate the concept of materialism, and argues that materialism isn't contingent. Teller, P. 1985. Is supervenience just undisguised reduction? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:93-100. 3.2 Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [39] ------------------------------- Davidson, D. 1970. Mental events. In (L. Foster & J. Swanson, eds) _Experience and Theory_. Humanities Press. Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). Arguing for anomalous monism: no strict psychophysical laws, no strict psychological laws, and token identity without type identity. Mental events can still cause, via subsumption under physical laws. Davidson, D. 1973. The material mind. In (P. Suppes, ed) _Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science_. North-Holland. Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). The psychological supervenes on the physical but is not reducible to it, because of the holistic nature of intentional attribution. So building a perfect physical model may not explain psychology. Davidson, D. 1974. Psychology as philosophy. In (S. Brown, ed) _Philosophy of Psychology_. Harper & Row. Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). On the differing constitutive standards of mental and physical concepts. Attribution of mental concepts is holistic, and presupposes a background of rationality, etc. With examples from decision theory. Davidson, D. 1980. _Essays on Actions and Events_. Oxford University Press. A collection of papers on action, causation and the philosophy of psychology. Davidson, D. 1987. Problems in the explanation of action. In (P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, & J. Norman, eds) _Metaphysics and Morality_. Blackwell. Remarks on how mental properties can explain action without strict laws. The mental is a conceptual, not an ontological category, governed by normative standards, and not reducible to the non-normative. Davidson, D. 1992. Thinking causes. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Antony, L. 1989. Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force. Philosophical Review 98: 153-87. Criticism of Davidson's argument for rational causation. Reasons must cause in virtue of their rational properties. Token identities can't exist, due to normativity. Quinean psychology can't yield rational explanations. Bickle, J. 1992. Mentaly anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59:217-30. Child, W. 1993. Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations. Philosophical Review. Anomalism is compatible with supervenience, if it is construed as denying psychophysical laws useful for explaining behavior. It is incompatible with token identity, though. With much on the uncodifiability of rationality. Cooper, W.E. 1980. Materialism and madness. Philosophical Papers 9:36-40. Elgin, C. 1980. Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism. Synthese 45:233-55. Goldberg, B. 1977. A problem with anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 32:175-80. Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws. Hess, P. 1981. Actions, reasons and Humean causes. Analysis 41:77-81. Anomalous monism implies that mental properties don't cause anything. Honderich, T. 1982. The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42:59-64. If anomalous monism is true, mental events may cause, but their mental properties aren't causally relevant. Johnston, M. 1985. Why having a mind matters. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Anomalous monism loses out to Australian materialism. It can't be a priori, it leads to exhaustive monism, it doesn't support a new view of free action, and it implies the causal irrelevance of the mental. Kalderon, M.E. 1987. Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52:71-90. Davidson's view leads to epiphenomenalism about content, as it can't support the appropriate counterfactuals. Strong supervenience might be a way out, but that is inconsistent with anomalism. Kernohan, A. 1985. Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? Dialogue 24:427-42. Kim, J. 1985. Psychophysical laws. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). How there can be psychophysical generalizations but no laws -- they might lack modal force. On the relation between psychophysical anomalism and psychological anomalism. Casting Davidson as a Kantian dualist. Klagge, J.C. 1990. Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85:339-52. Anomalous supervenience is consistent, at the cost of anti-realism about the mental. Supervenience is a constraint on interpretation, but needn't support counterfactuals as different interpretation schemes are possible, Klee, R. 1992. Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43:389-403. Problems with holism and ceteris paribus laws aren't unique to psychology. One finds the same thing in the physical sciences. So rationality plays no special role, and psychological laws are as reasonable as physical laws. LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1987. Mind matters. Journal of Philosophy 630-42. Anomalous monism is not committed to epiphenomenalism, as even non-strict laws can ground counterfactuals and so support the causal relevance of mental properties. Lycan, W.G. 1981. Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12:9-38. A functionalist defense against anomalous monism. Psychofunctional laws and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist. Rebutting arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc. McDowell, J. 1985. Functionalism and anomalous monism. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Against Loar's functionalist reductionism: it doesn't begin to capture the normative role of rationality or the subjectivity of the mental. McLaughlin, B.P. 1985. Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. A very thorough summary of Davidson's views. Highly recommended. McLaughlin, B.P. & LePore, E. (eds) 1985. _Actions and Events_. Blackwell. 30 essays on Davidson. McLaughlin, B.P. 1992. Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Comments on Davidson 1992. Davidson can respond to critics accepting causal relevance of mental properties and still denying strict laws. Davidson misconstrues his critics' positions on supervenience. Melchert, N. 1986. What's wrong with anomalous monism. Journal of Philosophy 80:265-74. Davidson is concerned with intentional, not phenomenal states; and his characterization of these is just as physical states under a certain description. So he avoids epiphenomenalism (contra e.g. Honderich 1982). Miller, A. 1993. Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:335-44. Kim's version of Davidson's argument against psychophysical laws cannot work. Elucidating the notion of a constitutive principle. Noren, S.J. 1979. Anomalous monism, events, and `the mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40:64-74. Rosenberg, A. 1985. Davidson's unintended attack on psychology. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Anomalous monism implies that there aren't even heteronomic psychological generalizations, as variables can't be independently measured. Rowlands, M. 1990. Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation. Philosophia 295-310. Supervenience is compatible with anomalism: biconditional laws are ruled out by the disjunctive base, and the wideness of mental states rules out one-way psychophysical laws, as there's no single property in the base. Seager, W.E. 1981. The anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:389-401. Elucidating Davidson's argument, focusing on the argument against strict psychophysical laws. Generalizations involve disjunctive kinds and so are heteronomic and not law-like. Seager, W.E. 1991. Disjunctive laws and supervenience. Analysis 51:93-98. Argues contra Kim that supervenience is compatible with anomalous monism: the the disjunctive generalizations aren't lawlike, as they aren't confirmed by their instances. Smart, J.J.C. 1985. Davidson's minimal materialism. In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. Some comments on holism, indeterminacy, anomalism, and materialism. Smith, P. 1982. Bad news for anomalous monism? Analysis 42:220-4. Response to Honderich 1982: physical events are individuated as mental states by virtue of their causal role, so the mental is causally relevant. Stanton, W.L. 1983. Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:72-9. Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with anomalous monism. On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law. Suppes, P. 1985. Davidson's views on psychology as a science. In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. Various: physics is indeterministic and intensional, animals have beliefs, psychology has derived laws, and decision-theory doesn't need speech. van Gulick, R. 1980. Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental. Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404. Rationality constraints don't introduce an irreducibly normative element into intentional attributions. Rationality serves as a condition of adequacy for psychophysical theories, but it doesn't rule them out. Vermazen, B. & Hintikka, M. (eds) 1985. _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. 12 essays on Davidson, with replies. 3.3 Reduction [24] ------------- Backermann, A. 1992. Reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On varieties of physicalism with respect to reduction: semantic physicalism, identity theory, supervenience, and the denial of emergence. Advocates a version on which physical states realize mental states. Beckermann, A. 1992. Supervenenience, emergence, and reduction. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On varieties of supervenience and of emergence, and of what is required for reduction. Argues that reduction involves general explanatory connections, whereas emergence involves unique and ultimate bridge laws. Boyd, R. 1980. Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol 1. MIT Press. Bunzl, M. 1987. Reductionism and the mental. American Philosophical Quarterly 24:181-9. On the links between supervenience, reduction, and explanation. Supervenience is compatible with reductive explanation of a localized variety. We don't need laws, but explanatory links. Churchland, P.M. 1982. Is `thinker' a natural kind? Dialogue 21:223-38. Psychology shouldn't be autonomous from natural science. By analogy with biology, nature provides (a) conceptual insight, and (b) real constraints, e.g. thermodynamic ones. Biology and psychology are continuous. Dupre, J. 1988. Materialism, physicalism, and scientism. Philosophical Topics 16:31-56. Arguing for a pluralistic conception. With criticism of Churchland's reductionism, Davidson's token identity, and more generally reverential "scientism". Reductionist explanation is not the general rule. Endicott, R.P. 1989. On physical multiple realization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70:212-24. Endicott, R.P. 1993. Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies. Erkenntnis 38:303-21. On species-specific reductions. These can't reduce standard psychological properties, and problems with intra-species multiple realization can't be circumvented without giving up property reduction for token event identity. Fodor, J.A. 1974. Special sciences. Synthese 28:97-115. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Psychological kinds can't be reduced to physical kinds, due to cross-classification, although token physicalism still holds. How to maintain the generality of physics without a reductionist unity of science. Hill, C.S. 1984. In defense of type materialism. Synthese 59:295-320. Kitcher, P.S. 1980. How to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 47:134-40. Contra Richardson 1979, a purely functional psychology is irreducible. The genetics analogy is misleading; multiple realizations can't explain high-level laws. Kim, J. 1989. The myth of non-reductive materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63(3):31-47. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive. Kim, J. 1992. Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:1-26. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Multiple realization is compatible with reductionism. Jade (= jadeite or nephrite) isn't a scientific kind, and neither are multiply realizable mental properties. So there's no global psychology, just lots of local reductions. Menzies, P. 1988. Against causal reductionism. Mind 97:551-74. Montgomery, R. 1990. The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology. Synthese 85:279-314. Anti-reductionism needn't be ad hoc (contra Churchland). Although evolution provides some pressure for 1-1 psychophysical mappings, there are significant countervailing forces, e.g. in vision, memory, learning, and language use. Nelson, A. 1985. Physical properties. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:268-82. Some comments on Wilson 1985: some special-science properties may be relevantly different in kind from his expanded physical properties. Papineau, D. 1985. Social facts and psychological facts. In (G. Currie & A. Musgrave, eds) _Popper and the Human Sciences_. Martinus Nijhoff. Mind is not reducible to body, but societies reduce to individuals. Multiple realization is in tension with predictability. Natural selection resolves the tension for the mental, but cannot for the social. Papineau, D. 1991. Irreducibility and teleology. In (Charles, ed) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_. Oxford University Press. Non-reductive physicalism is a mystery unless we invoke teleology. Pereboom, D. & Kornblith, H. 1991. The metaphysics of irreducibility. Philosophical Studies 63:125-45. Explicating anti-reductionism: mental causal powers are constituted of physical causal powers, but aren't type- or token-identical to them. Against arguments from local reduction, neuroscience, explanatory exclusion, etc. Richardson, R.C. 1979. Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46:533-58. Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology. Richardson, R.C. 1982. How not to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 49:125-37. Response to Kitcher 1980. Reductions are usually domain-specific, and high-level regularities are indeed explained. van Gulick, R. 1992. Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On how a nonreductive materialism can handle problems about mental causation, psychophysical dependencies, and qualia. A teleofunctionalist view with different conceptual frameworks, but mental properties physically realized. Wilson, M. 1985. What is this thing called `pain'? -- The philosophy of science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:227-67. Argues for type-type identities and for an expanded view of the physical, as properties from physics exhibit the same sort of multiple realizability as functional properties. Sophisticated, with many interesting examples. Wimsatt, W. 1976. Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem. In (G. Globus, ed) _Consciousness and the Brain_. Plenum Press. Excellent coverage of the notion of level and its applicability to mind. 3.4 Token Identity [6] ------------------ Horgan, T. & Tye, M. 1985. Against the token identity theory. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. We individuate mental events by their causal role, but we can't individuate causes uniquely. So each mental event has multiple physical correlates, and token identity doesn't hold. Hornsby, J. 1981. Which physical events are mental events? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92. Haugeland, J. 1982. Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19:93-103. Supervenience doesn't imply token identity, and Davidson's argument for token identity equivocates on "event". But weak supervenience (mentally discernible worlds are physically discernible) is all we need. With nice examples. Leder, D. 1985. Troubles with token identity. Philosophical Studies 47:79-94. Physical/psychological token identity is no good: you can't individuate physical events without psychological predicates. Lurie, Y. 1978. Correlating brain states with psychological phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56:135-44. Can't isolate the physical token of a belief, say, as it's always accompanied by other beliefs. Meaning doesn't come in discrete tokens. Peacocke, C. 1979. Argument for token identity. In _Holistic Explanation_. Oxford University Press. 3.5 Mental Causation [22] -------------------- Baker, L.R. 1993. Metaphysics and mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Mental causation is incompatible with strong supervenience and causal closure of physics, as we can't distinguish high-level causes from non-causes. So reject the metaphysics and make explanation prior to causation. Block, N. 1989. Can the mind change the world? In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam_. Cambridge University Press. Rescuing content from epiphenomenalism via functional role argument; but then functional roles aren't really causally efficacious (cf. dormitive virtue), so epi all over again? Roles vs fillers, causation vs explanation. Burge, T. 1993. Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Mental causation is not a real worry, but the to-do shows that materialist metaphysics has shed little light on it. It needs to be understood at the mental level. With remarks on exclusion arguments and token identity. Crane, T. 1992. Mental causation and mental reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:185-202. Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be. Dretske, F. 1993. Mental events as structuring causes of behavior. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Mental events are structuring causes of behavior; biological events are triggering causes, dependent on previous mental structuring. This allows extrinsic properties to play a causal role. Fodor, J.A. 1989. Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics 17:59-79. Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990). Non-strict psychological laws are compatible with the (nomologically sufficient) causal responsibility of mental properties. So there's no need for epiphobia. With comments on the relation between laws and mechanisms. Heil, J. 1992. Mentality and causality. Topoi 11:103-110. On various problems with mental causation, and the relationship between psychology ans philosophy. Honderich, T. 1993. The union theory and anti-individualism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. The identity theory and psychoneural correlation can't handle mental causation; only the union theory can. Anti-individualism causes problems, but should be rejected in any case. Horgan, T. 1989. Mental quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74. How mental events are causally relevant qua mental: via an account of "qua" causation in general, using counterfactuals on "pertinently similar worlds". Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. Causation and the philosophy of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50:195-214. A defence of functional role as a causally efficacious property of physical states. With application to connectionism & eliminativism. Kim, J. 1984. Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:257-70. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Psychological causation, like all macrocausation, is supervenient epiphenomenal causation. Kim, J. 1992. The nonreductivist's trouble with mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Argues that nonreductive materialism implies downward causation (as the mental has more causal powers than the physical alone), and that downward causation violates the causal closure of the physical. Kim, J. 1992. "Downward causation" in emergentism and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. Argues that nonreductive materialism is just like 1930s emergentism, with the the mental contributing new causal powers, and so implies downward causation. Kim, J. 1993. Mental causation in a physical world. In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Science and Knowledge_. Ridgeview. LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1989. More on making mind matter. Philosophical Topics 17:175-91. On the problems that irreducibility -- multiple realizability, normativity, and non-supervenience -- poses for mental causation. Criticizes Kim's supervenient causation and Fodor's causal powers, and looks to "quasation". Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1986. Mental causes and explanation of action. Philosophical Quarterly 36:145-58. Macdonald, C. & Macdonald, G. 1991. Mental causation and nonreductive monism. Analysis 51:23-32. McLaughlin, B.P. 1989. Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical. Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135. Physical comprehensiveness and mental/physical non-reductionism don't imply mental inefficacy; nor does anomalous monism. Non-physical types can still can be causal, though they must be accompanied by physical causation. Searle, J.R. 1984. Intentionality and its place in nature. Synthese 61:3-16. Intentionality is caused by the physical, and causes. More a 1P emphasis. Sosa, E. 1984. Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:271-81. Interactionist dualism is out, supervenient causation is in. But there are problems with mental events being causally relevant qua mental, esp for anomalous monism. cf. loud shot causes death, but loudness isn't relevant. van Gulick, R. 1993. Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work? In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. On three arguments against mental causation, from strict laws, non-local supervenience, and especially exclusion. Mental properties are stable, recurring high-level patterns with their own causal relevance. Yablo, S. 1992. Mental causation. Philosophical Review 101:245-280. Argues that mental events/properties stand to physical events/properties as determinable to determinates, solving the exclusion problem. Some mental events are *better* candidates for the cause of action than physical events. 3.6 Psychophysical Relations, Misc [15] ---------------------------------- Blackburn, S. 1991. Losing your mind: Physics, identity, and folk burglar prevention. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. Arguing for the causal efficacy and scientific respectability of higher-order states, such as functional-role states. To require appeal to particular physical states is to succumb to a "Tractarian" view of physical primacy. Crane, T. 1991. All God has to do. Analysis 51:235-44. If there are no contingent psychophysical laws, then there are no mental properties. So physicalism/supervenience is false; God had extra work to do. Crane, T. & Mellor, D.H. 1990. There is no question of physicalism. Mind 99:185-206. Physical sciences have no ontological authority over the mental. Considers and dismisses arguments from laws, causation, reduction, supervenience. Enc, B. 1983. In defense of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 80:279-98. Honderich, T. 1981. Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24:277-303. Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents. Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents. But occurrents may not be causally efficacious. Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich. Horgan, T. 1992. Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychology. In (Wagner/Warner, eds) _Beyond Naturalism and Physicalism: Notes Toward a Program_. University of Notre Dame Press. Gives four constraints on interlevel connections, and some arguments against reductionism and for the autonomy of psychology. Argues that supervenience fact are themselves in need of explanation. Kernohan, A. 1988. Non-reductive materialism and the spectrum of mind-body identity theories. Dialogue 27:475-88. Classifying psychophysical theories by the status (necessary, lawful, anomalous, false) of psychophysical/psychological generalizations. Defending autonomous monism: nonreductive materialism with psychological laws. McGinn, C. 1978. Mental states, natural kinds and psychophysical laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Argues that mental kinds are not natural kinds, and don't have real essences but nominal essences. For this reason, there are no psychophysical laws. With remarks on psychological laws, and the role of behavior. McGinn, C. 1980. Philosophical materialism. Synthese 44:173-206. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). McLaughlin, B.P. 1992. The rise and fall of British emergentism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. A careful account of British emergentism. Explicates their view of emergent causal powers and laws in terms of fundamental configurational forces, a coherent idea that turned out to be false. An excellent paper. Poland, J. 1994. _Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations_. Oxford University Press. Skillen, A. 1984. Mind and matter: a problem which refuses dissolution. Mind 93:514-26. Physical completeness, mental causation, non-reductionism are inconsistent. Ryle and Putnam are closet dualists, and Davidson's an epiphenomenalist. Stephan, A. 1992. Emergence -- a systematic look at its historical facets. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On different ways of understanding emergence: as nonadditivity, novelty, nonpredictability, nondeducibility; and on problems about qualia and downward causation. Teller, P. 1992. A contemporary look at emergence. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. An attempt to explicate "emergent" properties in terms of relational properties. Argues that even problem cases, e.g. space-time separation and phenomenal properties, might be treated this way. Wilkes, K.V. 1973. _Physicalism_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3.7 Functionalism [59] ----------------- 3.7a Causal Role Functionalism (Armstrong/Lewis) [15] ------------------------------------------------ Armstrong, D.M. 1968. _A Materialist Theory of the Mind_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mental states should be analyzed as states that are apt to bring about certain kinds of behavior. Analysis of all kinds of mental states as such. With comments on dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, and consciousness. Armstrong, D.M. 1970. The nature of mind. In (C. Borst, ed) _The Mind/Brain Identity Theory_. Macmillan. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Mental states are internal states that are apt to cause certain behaviors. A synthesis between the "thesis" of idealism and the "antithesis" of behaviorism. With defense against objections from consciousness. Clark, A. 1986. Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53:535-59. Psychofunctionalism can evade chauvinism by specifying different functional identifications within each species. Applying same mental terms to each is justified by theory similarity; but it still isn't analytic functionalism. Goldstein, I. 1994. Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:46-62. Against functionalism: experiences have intrinsic introspectible acausal properties, such as duration, felt location, and unpleasantness. Both analytic and empirical functionalism fail. Horgan, T. 1984. Functionalism and token physicalism. Synthese 59:321-38. Formalizing versions of functionalism, and seeing which entail token physicalism and/or type physicalism. On the most plausible versions, we have token physicalism without type physicalism. Hornsby, J. 1984. On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter<, and Prior on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46:75-96. Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E.W. 1982. Functionalism and type-type identity theories. Philosophical Studies 42:209-25. Functionalism is compatible with type identity, as e.g. "pain" designates the state-type that fills the right functional role in an organism at a given time, i.e. a brain state. Contra Kripke, pain is not a rigid designator. Kernohan, A. 1990. Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3:235-46. Argues that Lewis's functionalism founders on the specification of behavior. Described intentionally => non-materialist; physically => chauvinist. Lewis, D. 1966. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in _Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). Causal roles are definitive of mental states. Since physical states fill these causal roles (by the explanatory adequacy of physics), mental states are physical states. Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:249-58. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Mental states can be defined, via a Ramsey-sentence analysis of the platitudes of folk psychology, as entities that fill causal roles specified by the analysis. These fillers turn out to be physical. Lewis, D. 1978. Mad pain and martian pain. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1. MIT Press. Accounting for both pains that don't play the usual causal role and for pains that are realized in different substances, by a mixed theory: pain is the physical state that typically occupies a certain causal role in a population. McGinn, C. 1980. Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:35-46. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Functionalism (reducing the mental to its effects on the physical) is no more plausible than phenomenalism (reducing the physical to its effects on the mental). Owens, J. 1982. The failure of Lewis's functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 36:159-73. Lewis's original theory leads to Kripkean reference-fixing, so chauvinism. Token functionalism can't deal with paralytics. Species-relative functionalism fails as pain is intrinsic, not extrinsic. Shoemaker, S. 1981. Some varieties of functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12:93-119. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper. Tye, M. 1983. Functionalism and type physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44:161-74. Contra Lewis: Functionalism isn't compatible with type physicalism. There are intra-population difficulties with species-relative construals, and individual-relative construals can still have multiple fillers. 3.7b Machine Functionalism (Putnam) [16] ----------------------------------- Putnam, H. 1960. Minds and machines. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). The relationship between mental and physical states is just like that between logical and structural states of Turing Machines, so no great mystery. With comments on privacy and semantic analysis. Putnam, H. 1967. The nature of mental states. In (Capitan & Merrill, eds) _Art, Mind, and Religion_. Pittsburgh University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Why mental states are more likely to be functional states (in probabilistic automata) than brain states or behavioral dispositions. Putnam, H. 1967. The mental life of some machines. In (H. Castaneda, ed) _Intentionality, Minds and Perception_. Wayne State University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). On explaining behavior via TM states, e.g. explaining preference via utility functions. Logical behaviorism assumes rational preference functions. Functional organization is what matters, not physical make-up. Putnam, H. 1975. Philosophy and our mental life. In _Mind, Language, and Reality_. Cambridge University Press. Psychological states aren't TM states after all: we have lots of psych states at once; they depend on learning/memory; disjunctions of TM states are no good. But functional organization rather than physics is still what counts. Putnam, H. 1987. _Representation and Reality_. MIT Press. Type functionalism isn't any better than type physicalism, as mental states can be multiply realized as functional states. With what in common? Lycan, W.G. 1974. Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:48-62. On abstract vs. physical TMs: Putnam should say that mental states are physical TM states. But then functionalism is compatible with physicalism. On the relation between Putnam's and Armstrong's functionalism. Lycan, W.G. 1979. A New Lilliputian argument against machine functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35:279-87. If machine functionalism were true, a homunculus-head would have all the mental states of its homunculus (by the definition of "realization"), which is absurd. Lycan, W.G. 1983. The moral of the New Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43:277-80. Reply to Elugardo 1983: so how do you specify what count as inputs/outputs? Elugardo, R. 1981. Machine functionalism and the New Lilliputian argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:256-61. Criticism of Lycan 1979, and a re-making of the argument. Elugardo, R. 1983. Machine realization and the New Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43:267-75. Lycan's New Lilliputian argument fails as inputs/outputs for the homunculus are not the same as inputs/outputs for the full system. Kane, R.H. 1966. Turing machines and mental objects Nelson, R. 1974. Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 73:365-86. Argues for mechanism rather than functionalism. Criticizes Putnam for hypostasizing mental states, which are disanalogous to mental states. Defending mechanism against Kalke's & Rorty's objections. Rorty, R. 1972. Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 69:203-20. Logical states don't give us any understanding of mind over and above what the function/structure distinction gives us. In particular, it doesn't help with the understanding of privacy and incorrigibility. Stabler, E. 1987. Kripke on functionalism and automata. Synthese 70:1-22. Disputes Kripke's argument that there is no objective way of determining when a system computes a given function, due to infinite domains and unreliability. Stipulating normal background conditions is sufficient. Tomberlin, J. 1965. About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:295-99. Contra Putnam: logical states are not physical states, and utterances about them are not about physical states. Wagner, S.J. 1988. The liberal and the lycanthrope. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:165-74. Contra Lycan: machine functionalism can handle Bolivia and CRT cases by a causal/counterfactual account, and Lilliputian case by assigning mental states to minds, not bodies. 3.7c Functionalism, Miscellaneous [28] --------------------------------- Adams, F. 1979. Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory. Eidos 1:153-79. Bealer, G. 1978. An inconsistency in functionalism. Synthese. A formal argument showing that functional definitions are equivalent to behavioral definitions. Bealer, G. 1985. Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:283-328. Bechtel, W. 1984. Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail. Philosophy of Science Association 1:43-55. The functional level is the appropriate level for psychology, but neurophysiological facts constrain this level and are thus relevant. Biro, J.I. & Shahan, R.W. (eds) 1982. _Mind, Brain and Function_. Oklahoma University Press. Ten papers on functionalism. Originally was Philosophical Topics, volume 12. Block, N. 1980. Functionalism. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1. MIT Press. Distinguishes varieties of functionalism, e.g. machine and Ramsey-sentence functionalism; and compares to behaviorism. With a historical overview, and arguments for why functionalism is incompatible with physicalism. Block, N. 1978. Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325. Reprinted in _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Distinguishes analytic and empirical functionalism. Both have problems with absent qualia, and inputs/outputs. Analytic functionalism has problems with paralytics, etc; empirical functionalism has problems with Martians. Block, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Mental states are not physical or behavioral states; could they be functional states? With various arguments against type identity, and against machine-table functionalism. Cummins, R. 1975. Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy 72:741-64. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). On the role of functional explanation versus other kinds of explanation. Functionalism applies an analytic, not subsumptive strategy. Fischer, J. 1985. Functionalism and propositions. Philosophical Studies 48:295-311. Fodor, J.A. 1968. Materialism. In _Psychological Explanation_. Random House. On mental state as inferred theoretical entities, individuated according to their function (cf. valve-lifters). Psychology and neuroscience will mutually constrain each other, giving a relation more complex than reduction. Gendron, B. 1970. On the relation of neurological and psychological theories: A critique of the hardware thesis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8:483-95. Argues that functional explanation are reducible to structural explanations. Hoy, R.C. 1980. Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents. Synthese 44:207-40. Kalke, W. 1969. What's wrong with Fodor's and Putnam's functionalism. Nous 3:83-93. There's no absolute functional/structural distinction, as it depends on how you choose boundaries and levels of abstraction. Lycan, W.G. 1981. Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50. Pursue a multi-leveled homuncular functionalism, with mental states characterized as states of teleologically identified subsystems. Even the identity theorist is a functionalist at a low level. Malcolm, N. 1980. `Functionalism' in philosophical psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:211-30. Pereboom, D. 1991. Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist. Synthese 88:341-58. Scientific realism requires dispositions of kinds be explained by intrinsic properties. Neural/functional properties won't work, because of reductionism and circularity. Use intrinsic psychological properties instead. Richardson, R.C. 1979. Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46:533-58. Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology. Schiffer, S. 1986. Functionalism and belief. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_. University of Arizona Press. Against functionalism for beliefs. Both common-sense functionalism and psychofunctionalism have problems with finding the right functional theory, distinguishing beliefs, perceptual input conditions, Twin Earth, etc. Shope, R.K. 1973. Functional equivalence and the defense of materialism. Philosophical Forum 4:500-12. Sober, E. 1990. Putting the function back into functionalism. In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_. Blackwell. Need teleological functionalism, not Turing Machine functionalism. Sober, E. 1985. Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind. Synthese 64:165-93. van Gulick, R. 1982. Functionalism as a theory of mind. Philosophy Research Archives 185-204. The structure/function distinction is level-relative, so physiology might be relevant even under functionalism. Problems with automata, and with causal connections to nonintentionally characterized behavior. van Gulick, R. 1980. Functionalism, information and content. Nature and System 2:139-62. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Ward, A. 1989. Philosophical functionalism. Behaviorism 17:155-8. Weckert, J. 1990. Functionalism's impotence. Philosophical Inquiry 32-43. Wilkes, K.V. 1981. Functionalism, psychology and the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Topics 12:147-67. Functionalism may be appropriate for cognitive psychology but not for folk psychology, due to differing goals. Neuroscience will play an important role in developing functional theories. Zangwill, N. 1992. Functionalism and variable realization. Philosophical Quarterly 42:214-19. Argues that the possibility of multiple realization has not been established, whether by arguments from imagination, concepts, or empirical facts. 3.8 Computationalism (see also Part 4) [23] -------------------- Block, N. 1990. The computer model of mind. In (D. Osherson & E. Smith, eds) _An Invitation to Cognitive Science_, Vol. 3. MIT Press. Overview of computationalism. Relationship to intentionality, LOT, etc. Boden, M. 1984. What is computational psychology? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:17-35. Chalmers, D.J. 1994. A computational foundation for the study of cognition. Manuscript. Argues for theses of computational sufficiency and computational explanation, resting on the fact that computation provides an abstract specification of causal organization. With replies to many anti-computationalist worries. Clarke, J. 1972. Turing machines and the mind-body problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23:1-12. Cummins, R. 1977. Programs in the explanation of behavior. Philosophy of Science 44:269-87. Demopoulos, W. 1987. On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism. Synthese 70:79-96. On analog/digital, representational/nonrepresentational, direct/indirect. Dietrich, E. 1989. Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational psychology. Synthese 79:119-41. Argues that computational explanation requires the attribution of semantic content. Addresses Stich's arguments against content, and argues that computers are not formal symbol manipulators. Dietrich, E. 1990. Computationalism. Social Epistemology. What computationalism is, as opposed to computerism & cognitivism. Implies: intentionality isn't special, and we don't make decisions. With commentary. Double, R. 1987. The computational model of the mind and philosophical functionalism. Behaviorism 15:131-39. Dretske, F. 1985. Machines and the mental. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:23-33. Machines can't even add, let alone think, as the symbols they use aren't meaningful to them. They would need real information based on perceptual embodiment, and conceptual capacities, for meaning to play a real role. Fodor, J.A. 1978. Computation and reduction. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 9. Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press,80). Goel, V. 1991. Notationality and the information processing mind. Minds and Machines 1:129-166. Adapting Goodman's notational systems to explicate comp info processing. What is/isn't a physical notational system (e.g. LOT, physical symbol systems, connx) and why. How can we reconcile notational/mental content? Mellor, D.H. 1984. What is computational psychology? II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:37-53. Mellor, D.H. 1989. How much of the mind is a computer. In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_. Kluwer. Only belief is computational: rest of mind is not. Nelson, R. 1987. Machine models for cognitive science. Philosophy of Science Argues contra Pylyshyn 1984 that finite state automata are good models for cognitive science: they are semantically interpretable and process symbols. Pollock, J. 1989. _How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon_. MIT Press. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1980. Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:111-32. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1984. _Computation and Cognition_. MIT Press. A thorough account of the symbolic/computational view of cognition. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1978. Computational models and empirical constraints. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1:98-128. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1989. Computing and cognitive science. In (M. Posner, ed) _Foundations of Cognitive Science_. MIT Press. An overview of the computational view of mind. On symbols, levels, control structures, levels of correspondence for computational models, and empirical methods for determining degrees of equivalence. Searle, J.R. 1990. Is the brain a digital computer? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64:21-37. Syntax isn't intrinsic to physics, so computational ascriptions are assigned by observer. Syntax has no causal powers. Brain doesn't process information. Sterelny, K. 1989. Computational functional psychology: problems and prospects. In (P. Slezak, ed) _Computers, Brains and Minds_. Kluwer. Various points on pros and cons of computational psychology. van Gelder, T. 1993. What might cognition be if not computation? Manuscript. Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational and non-representational. Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governer to argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation. 3.9 Psychology and Neuroscience [18] ------------------------------- Bealer, G. 1987. The boundary between philosophy and cognitive science. Journal of Philosophy 86:553-55. Philosophy is autonomous: empirical considerations can't affect it. Bechtel, W. 1983. A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The functional architecture of mind. Philosophical Studies 44:319-30. Arguing for the notion of functional architecture as a bridge whereby neural components can be components of cognitive processes. Cherniak, C. 1994. Philosophy and computational neuroscience. Philosophical Studies 73:89-107. Argues that we can understand the brain under the hypothesis that it is optimized to "save wire", due to bounded resources: organization predicts placement. With remarks on the relation between cognitive and neural levels. Churchland, P.S. 1980. A perspective on mind-brain research. Journal of Philosophy 77:185-207. The brain can tell us a lot about the mind. With examples. Churchland, P.S. 1982. Mind-brain reduction: New light from philosophy of science. Neuroscience 7:1041-7. Churchland, P.S. 1986. _Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain_. MIT Press. All about neuroscience, philosophy and prospects for their interaction. Churchland, P.M. 1986. Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. Mind 95:279-309. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Some cute examples of neurophysiological reductions using state-spaces. Churchland, P.S. & Sejnowski, T. 1989. Neural representation and neural computation. In (L. Nadel, ed) _Neural Connections, Mental Computations_. MIT Press. About how neuroscience and connectionism affect our conception of mind. Churchland, P.S. 1987. Epistemology in the age of neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy 84:546-53. On paradigm shifts, biology, evolution, connectionism, etc. Hardcastle, V.G. 1992. Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain sciences. _Philosophy of Science_ 59:408-28. The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched by the other. With a number of examples from recent empirical work. Hatfield, G. 1988. Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints. Cognitive Neuropsychology 5:723-46. Klagge, J.C. 1989. Wittgenstein and neuroscience. Synthese 78:319-43. Wittgenstein wouldn't have liked the Churchlands, as neuro might be chaos, and too much neuro might undermine our self-conception nihilistically. Madell, G. 1986. Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response. Inquiry. McCauley, R. 1986. Intertheoretic relations and the future of psychology. Philosophy of Science 53:179-99. Incommensurable theories don't necessarily require elimination, if their relationship is synchronic/interlevel, rather than diachronic/intralevel. Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity thesis and neuropsychology. Nous 8:327-42. Argues contra Fodor and Block that neurological equipotentiality doesn't refute type materialism. Mental states may not be anatomically defined neural states, but they may be more abstract neural holograms. Smith, A. 1986. Brain-mind philosophy. Inquiry 29:203-15. Skarda, S. 1986. Explaining behavior: Bringing the brain back in. Inquiry 29:187-201. von Eckardt, B. 1984. Cognitive psychology and principled skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 81:67-88. Cognitive psychology can transmogrify itself, who needs neuroscience? 3.10 Psychological Explanation, Misc [14] ------------------------------------ Cummins, R. 1982. The internal manual model of psychological explanation. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:257-68. Cummins, R. 1983. _The Nature of Psychological Explanation_. MIT Press. Psych expln is typically via functional analysis, not causal subsumption. On the role of interpretation and computation. Toward an analysis of cognition and intentionality. With remarks on Dretske, Searle, Titchener, Hull, Freud. Fodor, J.A. 1968. _Psychological Explanation_. Random House. Fodor, J.A. 1968. The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65:627-40. Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980). Fodor, J.A. 1991. You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100:19-34. Ceteris paribus means that every realizing state has completing conditions. Even absolute exceptions are OK, as long as they're not across-the-board. Haugeland, J. 1978. The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1:215-26. Heil, J. 1986. Formalism and psychological explanation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:1-10. On the tension between formal explanation and representational explanation. Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. 1990. Soft laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15. Argues that any laws in intentional psychology have ineliminable same-level exceptions; the Kuhnian crisis in cognitive science gives evidence for this. But ceteris paribus laws provide perfectly good theoretical explanation. Kim, J. 1989. Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. *Philosophical Perspectives* 3:77-108. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Discusses the principle: there cannot be two independent explanations of the same phenomena. With application to purposive explanation of behavior, theory reduction, and eliminativism, and a discussion of explanatory realism. Kim, J. 1990. Explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation. In (E. Villanueva, ed.) _Information, Semantics, and Epistemology_. Blackwell. On the problems posed by explanatory exclusion, and possible solutions. With focus on the problems as they arise for Dretske's and Davidson's theories. Morris, M. 1986. Causes of behavior. Philosophical Quarterly 36:123-44. Mott, P. 1992. Fodor and ceteris paribus laws. Mind 101:335-46. Schiffer, S. 1991. Ceteris paribus laws. Mind 100:1-17. There are no ceteris paribus laws, as there's no satisfactory way to cash the "unless" cause. But psychology doesn't need laws, anyway. Sober, E. 1978. Psychologism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 8:165-91. 3.11 Philosophy of Mind, General [14] -------------------------------- Baker, L.R. 1989. Recent work in the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Books 30:1-9. A general overview. Bealer, G. 1986. The logical status of mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10. Burge, T. 1992. Philosophy of language and mind: 1950-1990. Philosophical Review 100:3-52. An overview of the last 40 years of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, covering many issues and trends. Churchland, P.M. 1984. _Matter and Consciousness_. MIT Press. Dennett, D.C. 1978. Current issues in the philosophy of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:249-261. An overview of everything, circa 1978: logical behaviorism, functionalism, the identity theory, qualia, meaning, and so on, with bibliography. Dennett, D.C. 1990. Granny's campaign for safe science. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. A general treatment of Fodor, identifying him as arch-conservative mentalist. Dennett, D.C. 1982. Why we think what we do about why we think what we do. Cognition. Commentary on Goodman 1982. Goodman, N. 1982. On thoughts without words. Cognition 12:211-17. Speculation on relationship between thoughts and words. Harman, G. 1989. Some philosophical issues in cognitive science. In (M. Posner, ed) _Foundations of Cognitive Science_. MIT Press. Haugeland, J. 1993. Mind embodied and embedded. Manuscript. Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with the world. With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a determinate interface. Mind is not an inner realm. McGinn, C. 1982. _The Character of Mind_. Oxford University Press. Quine, W.V. 1985. States of mind. Journal of Philosophy 82:5-8. Rorty, R. 1982. Contemporary philosophy of mind. Synthese 53:323-48. In praise of the "Ryle-Dennett" tradition, and the elimination of dualism from the philosophy of mind. Rorty, R. 1993. Consciousness, intentionality, and pragmatism. In (S. Christensen & D. Turner, eds) _Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind_. Lawreence Erlbaum. A pragmatist perspective on the recent history of the philosophy of mind, focusing on consciousness, intentionality, and mental representation, and on debates between Fodor, Dennett, Searle, Putnam, and Davidson. van Gelder, T. 1993. The distinction between mind and cognition. Manuscript. Argues against the contemporary "Cartesian" view of mind as an ontologically homogeneous inner representational realm that causes behavior, arguing for a holistic embodied view instead. Mind is therefore safe from elimination. -- Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, Washington University. (c) 1994 David J. Chalmers.