Part 2: Mental Content [378] ====================== Contents -------- 2.1 The Status of Propositional Psychology [132] 2.1a The Language of Thought (Fodor) [27] 2.1b Instrumentalism (Dennett) [24] 2.1c Syntactic Functionalism (Stich) [6] 2.1d Eliminativism (Churchlands) [38] 2.1e Propositional Attitudes, General [17] 2.1f The Nature of Folk Psychology [20] 2.2 Narrow/Wide Content [115] 2.2a Is Meaning in the Head? (Putnam, Burge) [22] 2.2b Individualism and Externalism in Psychology (Burge, Fodor) [38] 2.2c The Status of Narrow Content [32] 2.2d Content and Self-Knowledge [8] 2.2e Miscellaneous [15] 2.3 Causal Theories of Content [64] 2.3a Information-Based Accounts (Dretske, etc) [21] 2.3b Asymmetric Dependence (Fodor) [11] 2.3c Causal Accounts, General [9] 2.3d Teleological Approaches (Millikan, etc) [23] 2.4 Conceptual Role Semantics [13] 2.5 Representation (General) [18] 2.6 The Explanatory Role of Content [10] 2.7 Mental Content, Misc [26] 2.1 The Status of Propositional Psychology [132] ------------------------------------------ 2.1a The Language of Thought (Fodor) [27] ------------------------------------ Fodor, J.A. 1975. _The Language of Thought_. Harvard University Press. Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these are structured as sentences in a mental language. With linguistic and psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate. Fodor, J.A. 1987. Why there still has to be a Language of Thought. In _Psychosemantics_. MIT Press. Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity. Fodor, J.A. 1978. Propositional attitudes. Monist 61:501-23. Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980). About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought. Bonjour, L. 1991. Is thought a symbolic process? Synthese 89:331-52. Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content. With defence against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics. Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Fitzpatrick, J. 1990. Explanation and the language of thought. Synthese 83:3-29. No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic, and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections. Clark, A. 1988. Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science. Philosophical Psychology 1:263-78. Dennett, D.C. 1977. A cure for the common code. Mind. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). Review of Fodor's LOT. Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure, is criterial for content. The structure of a predictive theory need not be directly reflected in inner processing. Dennett, D.C. 1975. Brain writing and mind reading. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:403-15. Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978). On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments. Egan, M.F. 1991. Propositional attitudes and the language of thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21:379-88. Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT. Complex causes need not have LOT constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short. Field, H. 1978. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13:9-18. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence, along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition. With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions. Harman, G. 1973. _Thought_. Princeton University Press. Harman, G. 1975. Language, thought, and communication. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:270-298. Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language. Harman, G. 1977. How to use propositions. American Philosophical Quarterly. Harman, G. 1978. Is there mental representation? Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. Heil, J. 1981. Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? Mind 90:321-42. LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes. Also, symbols cannot denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation. Loar, B. 1982. Must beliefs be sentences? Philosophy of Science Association. Lycan, W.G. 1982. Toward a homuncular theory of believing. Cognition and Brain Theory 4:139-59. Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the way in. Lots of pro-belief arguments. Lycan, W.G. 1990. Mental content in linguistic form. Philosophical Studies 58:147-54. Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog. Matthews, R.J. 1989. The alleged evidence for representationalism. In (S. Silvers, ed) _Rerepresentation_. Kluwer. Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional attitudes. Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision. Matthews, R.J. 1991. Is there vindication through representationalism? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative distinction is untenable. But we can make sense of intentional causation and psychological explanation without explicit representation. Millikan, R. 1993. On mentalese orthography. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and his Critics_. Blackwell. On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought. There's no principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens with an identity judgment. With interesting remarks on co-identification. Pessin, A. 1993. Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. Philosophical Studies. Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese. Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail. Schiffer, S. 1991. Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics; productivity and systematicity can be explained without it. Stalnaker, R.C. 1990. Mental content and linguistic form. Philosophical Studies 58:129-46. Sterelny, K. 1983. Mental representation: What language is Brainese? Philosophical Studies, 43:365-82. Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief, identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism. Stich, S.P. 1978. Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science 45:499-518. Tienson, J. 1990. Is this any way to be a realist? Philosophical Psychology. 2.1b Instrumentalism (Dennett) [24] ------------------------------ Dennett, D.C. 1978. _Brainstorms_. MIT Press. Dennett, D.C. 1971. Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy 68:87-106 Reprinted in _Brainstorms (MIT Press, 1978).. Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance. Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution. Dennett, D.C. 1981. Making sense of ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12:63-81. Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT Press, 1987). Reply to Stich 1981. Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance). Etc. Dennett, D.C. 1987. _The Intentional Stance_. MIT Press. Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions. This isn't inconsistent with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction). Dennett, D.C. 1988. Precis of _The Intentional Stance_. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. TIS, with commentaries and replies. Dennett, D.C. 1990. The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50. Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an object's function. Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter. Dennett, D.C. 1991. Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88:27-51. Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that helps make sense of behavior. This degree of realism falls on a scale: Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland. Baker, L.R. 1987. Instrumentalism: Back from the brink? In _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on rationality, design features. Instrumentalism can't be rescued. Bechtel, W. 1985. Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance. Cognitive Science 9:265-92. Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety. Cam, P. 1984. Dennett on intelligent storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:247-62. Clark, A. 1990. Belief, opinion and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology. Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an add-on. Cummins, R. 1981. What can be learned from _Brainstorms_? Philosophical Topics 12:83-92. Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization and functional characterization. Arguing for the importance of context. Fodor, J.A. 1981. Three cheers for propositional attitudes. In _Representations_. MIT Press. Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be viewed as Platonic but epistemic. PA's are real and play real roles. Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1993. Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_. Blackwell. Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless, and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution) go wrong or beg the question. Haugeland, J. 1993. Pattern and being. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) _Dennett and His Critics_. Blackwell. Lyons, W. 1990. Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3:247-69. Matthews, R.J. 1990. The measure of mind. Bielefeld Report. A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement. McCulloch, G. 1990. Dennett's little grains of salt. Philosophical Quarterly 40:1-12. Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist. Nelkin, N. 1993. Patterns. Manuscript. Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional concepts. Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities, although still theoretical and still patterns. Richardson, R.C. 1980. Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? Cognition and Brain Theory 3:125-35. Sharpe, R. 1989. Dennett's journey towards panpsychism. Inquiry 32:233-40. Stich, S.P. 1980. Headaches. Philosophical Books 21:65-73. Critical review of Brainstorms, with response. Stich, S.P. 1981. Dennett on intentional systems. Philosophical Topics 12:39-62. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc. Hard line/soft line: either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away. Yu, P. & Fuller, G. 1986. A critique of Dennett. Synthese 66:453-76. Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views. Elucidates abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology. 2.1c Syntactic Functionalism (Stich) [6] ------------------------------------ Stich, S.P. 1983. _From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science_. MIT Press. Beliefs/desires are out, new Syntactic Theory is in. Crane, T. 1990. The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5:187-213. Egan, M.F. 1989. What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 56:664-74. Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc. Jacquette, D. 1990. Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax. Philosophical Quarterly, 40:169-82. Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True. Possin, K. 1986. The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind. Philosophical Studies 49:405-18. Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1987. What's in a mind? Synthese 70:97-122. Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function. 2.1d Eliminativism (Churchlands) [38] -------------------------------- Churchland, P.S. 1980. Language, thought, and information processing. Nous 14:147-70. Sentential processing is out. Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's Mentalese. Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images. Churchland, P.M. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78:67-90. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory. Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1983. Stalking the wild epistemic engine. Nous 17:5-20. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). How to dethrone language and still handle content. Churchland, P.M. 1985. On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:157-173. Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated. Churchland, P.M. 1989. _A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science_. MIT Press. 14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age. Churchland, P.M. 1993. Theory, taxonomy, and metholodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19. Reply to Haldane 1988. Even observations can be reconceived. With remarks perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane. Churchland, P.M. 1993. Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8:211-22. It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of eliminativism. On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating", "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives". Baker, L.R. 1987. The threat of cognitive suicide. In _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief. Rational acceptability, assertion, and truth are all at risk. Baker, L.R. 1988. Cognitive suicide. In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds) _Contents of Thought_. University of Arizona Press. Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable. Folk psychology needn't be scientifically reduced to be true. With comments by Chastain, and reply. Bickle, J. 1992. Revisionary physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7:411-30. Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather than elimination or smooth reduction. Sentential aspects will go, but coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain. Boghossian, P. 1990. The status of content. Philosophical Review 99:157-84. Irrealism about mental content (and therefore truth-conditions) can't be made sense of. An error thesis presupposes factual truth-conditions, and a non-factualist thesis presupposes a non-deflationary theory of truth. Boghossian, P. 1991. The status of content revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71:264-78. Reply to Devitt 1990. Cling, A. 1989. Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56:53-75. Unbelief in belief is not incoherent. Argues with Baker. Cling, A. 1990. Disappearance and knowledge. Philosophy of Science 57:226-47. Cling, A. 1991. The empirical virtues of belief. Philosophical Psychology 4:303-23. Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of behavior on perceptual features of the environment. Informational states alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features. Devitt, M. 1990. Transcendentalism about content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71:247-63. Against Boghossian's critique: the eliminativism will express her claim in a new framework, so appeals to truth beg the question. With a response. Devitt, M. & Rey, G. 1991. Transcending transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:87-100. Rejoinder to Boghossian 1990. Foss, J. 1985. A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement 11:105-33. EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho. Greenwood, J.D. 1991. Reasons to believe. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as causal explanation. We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g. from self-knowledge. They're useful in social psychology, too. Haldane, J. 1988. Understanding folk. Aristotelian Society Supplement 62:222-46. Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge is a pre-theoretical given. With remarks on laws, the prediction of behavior, and neuroscience. Hannan, B. 1990. `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 21-31. Hannan, B. 1993. Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative materialism. Mind and Language 8:165-179. A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory. With commentary. Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. 1985. Folk psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review 94:197-225. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g. incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and unfalsifiability. Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK. Horgan, T. & Graham, G. 1990. In defense of Southern Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62:107-134. FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the language of thought. FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral. Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism. Horgan, T. 1993. The austere ideology of folk psychology. Mind and Language. Argues that FP is not committed to much. The austere conception is supported by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it. Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous. Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1990. In defence of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 59:31-54. FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not propositinal attitudes are good scientific entities. Nice. Jacoby, H. 1985. Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies. Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning. (More about qualia than about intentional states.) Kitcher, P.S. 1984. In defense of intentional psychology. Journal of Philosophy 81:89-106. The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology. O'Brien, G. 1987. Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52:49-70. Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail. And some awareness is innate, so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time. Ramsey, W. 1990. Where does the self-refutation objection take us? Inquiry 33:453-65. The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections: counterexample, promissory note or reductio. Ramsey, W., Stich, S.P. & Garon, J. 1991. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology. In (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) _Philosophy and Connectionist Theory_. Erlbaum. If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system. Reppert, V. 1991. Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation. Inquiry 34:499-508. Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out. Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting. Reppert, V. 1992. Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy 23:378-92. A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief. An account of what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism. Robinson, W.S. 1985. Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism. Philosophical Topics 13:60-67. There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce. Rosenberg, A. 1991. How is eliminative materialism possible? In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness. EM isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief. Saidel, E. 1992. What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68. Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role. Stich, S.P. 1991. Do true believers exist? Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:229-44. Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions, as if folk psychology is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty. Stich, S.P. 1992. What is a theory of mental representation? Mind 101:243-61. Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts; real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision. The truth of eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose. 2.1e Propositional Attitudes, General [17] ------------------------------------- Baker, L.R. 1987. _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content. Baker, L.R. 1993. What beliefs are not. In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) _Critical Appraisal_. Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior: syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt causation leads to a circle. Belief is irreducible. Bennett, J. 1991. Analysis without noise. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution. On the roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles, teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution. Bennett, J. 1991. Folk-psychological explanations. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. On requirements for belief/desire explanations: input/output patterns, the unity condition (i.e. no single associated mechanism), and teleological bases for generalizations, e.g. through evolution or educability. Butler, K. 1992. The physiology of desire. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:69-88. Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind. Clark, A. 1991. Radical ascent. Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:211-27. The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise is to fall into a "modularity trap". A counterfactual account of mental causation is enough. With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables. Crimmins, M. 1992. Tacitness and virtual beliefs. Mind and Language 7:240-63. Fodor, J.A. 1986. Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent auntie's vade-mecum. Mind 94:76-100. Reprinted in _A Theory of Content and Other Essays_ (MIT Press, 1990). A taxonomy of positions on the representation of propositional attitudes: dividing up via questions about realism, functionalism, monadicity, and truth-conditions. With arguments for structured representations. Garfield, J. 1988. _Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind_. MIT Press. Graham, G. & Horgan, T. 1988. How to be realistic about folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1. Lycan, W.G. 1986. Tacit belief. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form, Content, and Function_. Oxford University Press. Maloney, J.C. 1990. It's hard to believe. Mind and Language 5:122-48. Manfredi, P.A. 1993. Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. Philosophia. Argues that there are no tacit beliefs: dispositions to believe can do all the explanatory work at lower cost. With some remarks on subdoxastic states, and the difference between belief and opinion. Millikan, R.G. 1986. Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95:47-80. Folk psychology isn't a theory about laws, but about proper functions. desires are identified by proper functions; beliefs by Normal explanations. Peacocke, C. 1983. Between instrumentalism and brain-writing. In _Sense and Content_. Oxford University Press. Instrumentalism about belief can't be right, because of Martian marionettes, but the language of thought is too strong a requirement. A state's structured content may reside in its pattern of relations to other states. Schwartz, J. 1992. Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type. Topoi 11:5-26. Stich, S.P. 1984. Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2.1f The Nature of Folk Psychology [20] ---------------------------------- Bogdan, R.G. (ed) 1991. _Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. Churchland, P.M. 1988. Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21. Reprinted in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_ (MIT Press, 1989). Folk psychology is a theory: defence against objections from logicality, softness of laws, practical function, behavior, and simulation. It needn't be a deductive-nomological theory; e.g. it might be based on prototypes. Clark, A. 1987. From folk psychology to naive psychology. Cognitive Science 11:139-54. Hey, folk psychology isn't all *that* bad. It survived evolution after all. Dennett, D.C. 1991. Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. FP is craft, not theory. Opinions rather than beliefs are interesting. Goldman, A. 1989. Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85. Goldman, A. 1992. The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. On the psychology of self-ascription of mental states. Functionalism has serious problems, as we don't have direct access to causal roles. Defends a qualia-based account, even for propositional attitudes. Gopnik, A. 1990. Developing the idea of intentionality: Children's theories of mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20:89-114. On the development of folk-psychological concepts in children. First the appearance/reality distinction, then more complex theories of perception, representation, and belief. Implications for the status of folk psychology. Gordon, R. 1986. Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1:158-71. FP is a strategy for prediction via simulation; an ability, not a theory. Graham, G. 1987. The origins of folk psychology. Inquiry 30:357-79. Greenwood, J.D. (ed) 1991. _The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science_. Cambridge University Press. Margolis, J. 1991. The autonomy of folk psychology. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. McDonough, R. 1991. A culturalist account of folk psychology. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. Morton, A. 1980. _Frames of Mind_. Oxford University Press. Morton, A. 1991. The inevitability of folk psychology. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Preston, J.M. 1989. Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism. Inquiry 32:277-303. Defending the claim that folk psychology is an empirical pre-scientific theory, with its own laws. In a particular, a detailed reply to the criticisms in Wilkes 1984. Sharpe, R. 1987. The very idea of a folk psychology. Inquiry 30:381-93. Stich, S.P., and Nichols, S. 1993. Folk psychology: simulation or tacit theory? In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Science and Knowledge_. Ridgeview. Wilkes, K.V. 1984. Pragmatics in science and theory in common sense. Inquiry 27:339-61. Wilkes, K.V. 1991. The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology. Synthese 89:15-39. Common-sense psychology is no theory at all, and not in competition with scientific psychology. CSP is particular, rich, vague; SP is general, austere, precise. CSP will be neither subsumed nor eliminated by SP. Wilkes, K.V. 1991. The long past and the short history. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. Argues that commonsense and scientific psychology are quite distinct in their aims, scope, framework, and nature, but have been confused by philosophy. With support from historical considerations. 2.2 Narrow/Wide Content [115] ----------------------- 2.2a Is meaning in the head? (Putnam, Burge) [22] -------------------------------------------- Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of `meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). What is in the head doesn't determine the reference of our thoughts: my twin on Twin Earth refers to XYZ where I refer to H2O. Content is determined by environment and linguistic community as well as by internal stereotypes. Putnam, H. 1987. Meaning, other people, and the world. In _Representation and Reality_. MIT Press. Meanings *still* aren't in the head. Burge, T. 1979. Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:73-122. Belief contents are not fully determined by internal state, as the linguistic community plays an important role: arthritis, brisket, contract, sofa, etc. So mental states are not individuated individualistically. Burge, T. 1982. Other bodies. In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and Object_. Oxford University Press. On Putnam's Twin Earth. Natural kind terms are not indexical. Even de dicto attitudes are not in the head; they presuppose the existence of other things. Burge, T. 1986. Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy 83:697-720. On non-individualist elements due to by intellectual norms in the community, to which meanings are answerable. Even meaning-giving truths can be doubted. With remarks on sofas/safos, and on linguistic meaning vs. cognitive value. Antony, M. 1993. Social relations and the individuation of thought. Mind 102:247-61. Bilgrami, A. 1987. An externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Topics 15:191-226. Developing an externalist account consistent with psychological explanation. Contra Burge, social links aren't constitutive of content. Causal links are indirectly constitutive of content, via our conceptions. Butler. K. 1993. Individualism, computationalism, and folk psychology. Manuscript. Challenges Burge's interpretations of the thought-experiments: e.g. twins have the same concept, neither of which is the public concept of arthritis. With remarks on computationalism and Marr's theory. Campbell, J. 1982. Extension and psychic state: Twin Earth revisited. Philosophical Studies 42:67-89. Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter. Crane, T. 1991. All the difference in the world. Philosophical Quarterly 41:1-25. Twins share the same concepts. Contra Putnam: essentialism is fallacious; contra Burge: speakers share beliefs, but one has false belief about meaning. Davies, M. 1992. Perceptual content and local supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45. Argues that perceptual content does not supervene on internal state, even though it is non-conceptual. Constructs an Twin scenario to that effect. With remarks on the relation between perceptual content and phenomenology. Devitt, M. 1990. Meanings just ain't in the head. In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam_. Cambridge University Press. Against Searle's theory of internal intentionality. Searle's theory requires magic to grasp external contents internally. Elugardo, R. 1993. Burge on content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:367-84. Contra Burge on sofas: oblique that-clauses can't identify the (wide) way that the subject thinks of sofas, which is idiosyncratic and inexpressible. McDowell, J. 1977. On the sense and reference of a proper name. Mind. McKinsey, M. 1991. The internal basis of meaning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72:143-69. Argues that meaning is determined by a certain kind of internal state, involving de se cognitive attitudes. These states aren't shared by twins, but are still narrow in a strong sense. Owens, J. 1983. Functionalism and the propositional attitudes. Nous 17:529-49. Functional organization doesn't determine attitude content, even if we include inputs and outputs. Perry, J. 1979. The problem of the essential indexical. Nous 13:3-21. Indexicals are essential to some beliefs, so belief cannot just be a relation to a proposition. Belief contents must be at least in part construed relative to a subject. Separate belief object and belief state. Searle, J.R. 1983. _Intentionality_. Cambridge University Press. Sure, meanings *are* in the head -- e.g. the content of a given visual experience is "the thing that is causing this experience". Sosa, E. 1991. Between internalism and externalism. In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Consciousness_. Ridgeview. Sosa, E. 1993. Abilities, concepts, and externalism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to internalism and externalism. Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized externally but determined internally. Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge. Stalnaker, R. 1993. Twin earth revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:297-311. Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are extrinsic. With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution. Woodfield, A. 1982. Thought and the social community. Inquiry 25:435-50. Burge's arguments show only that context-ascription is pragmatically sensitive to context, depending on the epistemic predicament of the ascriber. Content itself is still internal. Zemach, E.M. 1976. Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms. Journal of Philosophy 73:116-27. Argues that the extension of `water' is the same on earth and twin earth, using arguments from isotopes and scientific development. Molar properties determine classification. Remarks on historicism and the division of labor. 2.2b Individualism and Externalism in Psychology (Burge, Fodor) [38] --------------------------------------------------------------- Baker, L.R. 1993. Content and context. Philosophical Perspectives. Argues contra Fodor that broad contents can be explanatory -- if they can't, no relational properties can. Fodor's "no-conceptual-connection" and "cross-context" tests for causal powers fail to do the job. Burge, T. 1982. Two thought experiments reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:284-94. Reply to Fodor 1982, clarification of position. Burge, T. 1986. Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95:3-45. Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. Burge, T. 1989. Individuation and causation in psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 707:303-22. Contra Fodor: psychological processes can play differing causal roles, despite being physically identical. Davies, M. 1991. Individualism and perceptual content. Mind 100:461-84. Dretske, F. 1992. What isn't wrong with folk psychology. Metaphilosophy 23:1-13. Argues that extrinsic properties can play a respectable role in scientific explanation; e.g. the histories of plants, animals, and devices are relevant in explaining their current behavior. Dretske, F. 1993. The nature of thought. Philosophical Studies 70:185-99. Argues that thought is extrinsic, but it is not essentially social. A system without a linguistic community could have thoughts, if it had an appropriate learning history. Egan, M.F. 1991. Must psychology be individualistic? Philosophical Review 100:179-203. Maybe, maybe not. Contra Fodor: science can be non-individualistic. Contra Burge re oblique ascriptions and Marr. Fodor, J.A. 1980. Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:63-109. Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980). Should do psychology without reference to the external world. What counts for psychology is in the head; who cares about truth, reference, and the rest? Fodor, J.A. 1982. Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:98-118. Twin Earth isn't a problem for cognitive science. Intents of utterances, de re/de dicto, etc. Truth conditions aren't in the head, but that's no problem. Globus, G. 1984. Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology? Cognition and Brain Theory 7:233-46. Methodological solipsism implies epistemological solipsism. Hornsby, J. 1986. Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour. In (P. Pettit & J. McDowell, eds) _Subject, Thought, and Context_. Oxford University Press. Jacob, P. 1992. Externalism and mental causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:203-19. Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system. Kitcher, P.S. 1984. Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism. Philosophy of Science 52:78-97. Argues against Stich, Fodor, Block: use different taxonomies (narrow/wide) for different purposes. Both are OK, functionalism *and* content survive. Kobes, B. 1989. Semantics and psychological prototypes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70:1-18. Relates individualism debate to Roschian prototype research. Kobes, B. 1990. Individualism and artificial intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56. Winograd's SHRDLU doesn't support individualism: its concepts are anchored (to a fictional world) via its programmer, and it could have made errors. Marras, A. 1985. The Churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational psychology. Philosophy of Science 52:295-309. MS doesn't rule out all use of content, just of wide content. Narrow is OK. Stuff on folk psychology and computation. Good in places, confused in others. Maloney, J.C. 1985. Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Philosophy of Science 52:451-69. Various problems for computational psychology handling content. It shares the problems of a naturalistic psychology. Confused. Mandelkar, S. 1991. An argument against the externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Psychology 4:375-82. Argues that conscious experience is required for intentional states, and that any external relations could be satisfied without this experience, so external relations cannot suffice for intentional content. McClamrock, R. 1991. Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 3. Morton, P. 1993. Supervenience and computational vision in vision theory. Philosophy of Science 60:86-99. Noonan, H.W. 1984. Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris. Philosophical Studies 48:285-290. Noonan, H.W. 1993. Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Object-dependent thoughts are redundant in psychological explanation, as an explanation applying to a hallucinator will work as well. But this needn't defeat externalism in general. With remarks on self-knowledge. Patterson, S. 1991. Individualism and semantic development. Philosophy of Science 58:15-35. Developmental psychologists attribute concepts individualistically. Peacocke, C. 1993. Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67: 203-30. Externalist states are required for the explanation of relational properties. Counters objections from conceptual connections and dormitive-virtue worries, and applies to teleology, self-knowledge, etc. Petrie, B. 1990. Nonautonomous psychology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:539-59. Argues that behavior is often individuated widely for explanatory purposes, so that wide content is relevant, and that there is more to causation than local causation, so Stich's autonomy principle fails. Pettit, P. 1986. Broad-minded explanation and psychology. In (P. Pettit & J. McDowell, eds) _Subject, Thought and Context_. Oxford University Press. Segal, G. 1989. The return of the individual. Mind 98:39-57. Segal, G. 1989. Seeing what is not there. Philosophical Review 97:189-214. Contra Burge, Marr's theory is individualistic. Intentional contents therein are neutral between twins' environments; nothing grounds a more specific attribution. Segal, G. 1991. Defence of a reasonable individualism. Mind 100:485-94. Shapiro, L.A. 1993. Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision. Philosophical Review 102:489-513. Contra Segal, Marr's theory is non-individualistic even though it may classify twins together. Computational-level task descriptions rather than behavior guide content ascription, so the environment plays a crucial role. Sterelny, K. 1990. Animals and individualism. In (P. Hanson, ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_. University of British Columbia Press. Stich, S.P. 1978. Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis. Monist 61:573-91. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Beliefs are not in the head, so aren't good for psychological explanation. Interesting, but confuses the role of truth-values with truth-conditions. Tuomela, R. 1989. Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology. Philosophy of Science 56:23-47. Wallace, J. & Mason, H.E. 1990. On some thought experiments about mind and meaning. In (C. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) _Propositional Attitudes_. CSLI. Wilson, R.A. 1992. Individualism, causal powers, and explanation. Philosophical Studies 68:103-39. Science frequently appeals to relational and historical taxonomies, so either causal powers can be non-intrinsic or science needn't taxonomize by causal powers. With remarks on causal properties and conceptual connections. Wilson, R.A. 1993. Against a priori arguments for individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74:60-79. Arguments from causal powers beg the question, either on whether relational properties can have causal powers or on whether science taxonomizes by causal powers, as relational properties are common in scientific explanation. Wilson, R.A. 1994. Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology. Philosophy of Science. 2.2c The Status of Narrow Content [32] --------------------------------- Adams, F., Drebushenko, D., Fuller, G. & Stecker, R. 1990. Narrow content: Fodor's folly. Mind and Language 5:213-29. Traces and criticizes Fodor's position on narrow content. Argues that narrow content isn't content, and doesn't explain behavior. Fun but arguable. Adams, F. & Fuller, G. 1992. Names, contents, and causes. Mind and Language 7:205-21. Argues that problems with names don't require an appeal to narrow content in explanation. Broad content plus associated descriptions will do the job. Antony, L. 1989. Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science. In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam_. Cambridge University Press. Representational cognitive science has no need for narrow content -- wide contents and formal properties can do all the work. Argues that the semantics of mental expressions needn't mirror the semantics of language. Baker, L.R. 1985. A farewell to functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48:1-14. Argues that type-identical functional states can differ in narrow content, so methodological solipsism fails. Uses the example of identical programs for playing chess and arms negotiations. Baker, L.R. 1985. Just what do we have in mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:25-48. Some implausible twin cases trying to show that mental life can vary wildly while preserving physical/computational state. Bizarre. Baker, L.R. 1986. Content by courtesy. Journal of Philosophy 84:197-213. Baker, L.R. 1987. _Saving Belief_. Princeton University Press. Lots of arguments against narrow content. Very stimulating, though wrong. Biro, J.I. 1992. In defense of social content. Philosophical Studies 67:277-93. Contra Loar 1988, the contents of "that"-clauses often reflects psychological content, even if it sometimes does not. We don't need narrow content. Block, N. 1991. What narrow content is not. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. There are big problems specifying the "mapping" and the relevant contexts for Fodor's theory noncircularly. Narrow content either collapses into syntax or is too coarse-grained. Nontrivial narrow content must be holistic. Braun, D. 1991. Content, causation, and cognitive science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:375-89. Arguments for the causal significance of broad content. Physical twins can differ in causal powers; broad content figures in (ceteris paribus) causal generalizations; can make twin arguments against narrow content too. Hmm. Chalmers, D.J. 1994. The components of content. Manuscript. Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting notional and relational content. Notional content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation. Davies, M. 1986. Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83. Comments on Fodor 1987. Fodor doesn't make a conclusive case against externalism; but narrow content may be promising, and inexpressibility doesn't pose any real problems. With comparisons to neo-Fregean theories. Dennett, D.C. 1983. Beyond belief. In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and Object_. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in _The Intentional Stance_ (MIT Press, 1987). What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice. Devitt, M. 1990. The narrow representational theory of mind. In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_. Blackwell. Not syntactic psychology nor wide psychology, but narrow psychology. Fodor, J.A. 1987. Individualism and supervenience. In _Psychosemantics_. MIT Press. Science taxonomizes by causal powers, which are locally supervenient, so psychology needs a narrow notion of content. Proposes that a relativized notion -- a function from context to extension -- can do the job. Nice. Fodor, J.A. 1991. A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88:5-26. On when a difference in effects amounts to a difference in causal powers: when the effects are connected contingently, not conceptually, to the causes. Differences in wide content don't satisfy this, so aren't causal powers. Jackson, F., and Pettit, P. 1993. Some content is narrow. In (J. Heil and A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Argues that folk psychology needs a notion of narrow content to provide robust predictive behavioral generalizations that covers doppelgangers. If not, then some behavioral patterns would be flukey. LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1986. Solipsistic semantics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:595-614. There's no good way to construe narrow content. Phenomenologist strategy is intrinsically wide, and indexicalist strategy can't specify content. LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1989. Dual aspect semantics. In (S. Silvers, ed) _ReRepresentation_. Kluwer. Loar, B. 1987. Social content and psychological content. In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds) _Contents of Thought_. University of Arizona Press. Uses examples to argue that psychological content is not fixed by the content of "that"-clauses in belief ascription, and vice versa. We require a subtler kind of narrow content to capture what's going on. Loar, B. 1987. Subjective intentionality. Philosophical Topics 15:89-124. Maloney, J.C. 1991. Saving psychological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 61:267-83. Contests the "provoked/aggravated assault" example of Baker 1986. If they're doppelgangers, then their narrow content can't differ. McDermott, M. 1986. Narrow content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:277-88. Narrow beliefs are de re beliefs about our inputs and outputs. Putnam, H. 1987. Fodor and Block on narrow content. In _Representation and Reality_. MIT Press. Against perceptual-prototype and conceptual-role accounts of narrow content. Quillen, K. 1986. Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation. Mind and Language 1:133-57. Can't get a `mode of presentation' account of narrow content to work, either through description theory or prototypes. Psych should be non-individualist. Recanati, F. 1990. Externalism and narrow content. Nous. There are levels of narrowness, varying by whether independence is of actual or normal environment. Argues that this can be consistent with externalism. Stalnaker, R.C. 1990. Narrow content. In (C.A. Anderson & J. Owens, eds) _Propositional Attitudes_. CSLI. On some problems with narrow content, contra Loar 1987. Narrow content is hard to spell out with "diagonal" propositions. Loar doesn't show that psychological content is narrow. With some remarks on privileged access. Stich, S.P. 1991. Narrow content meets fat syntax. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Argues that narrow content is still too coarse-grained for explanation, classifying psychologically distinct states together. Use syntax instead. Taylor, K. 1989. Supervenience and levels of meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:443-58. Argues that the partial character construal of narrow content is not interestingly semantic. It collapses into syntax or phenomenology. Taylor, K. 1989. Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem. Nous 23:355-72. Uses a "fraternal twin earth" thought experiment to show that even de dicto attributions don't supervene on narrow role, and narrow content can't be explicated descriptively unless it collapses into phenomenalism. White, S. 1982. Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:347-65. Replies to Burge/Stich arguments by introducing "partial character" -- a function from context to content, analogous to Kaplan's character -- as the semantic property determined by functional state and relevant to explanation. Williams, M. 1990. Social norms and narrow content. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15:425-462. Narrow content theories can't handle the normativity of content. In-depth treatment of Burge cases and of the failures of causal and conceptual-role accounts. Normativity is fundamentally social. A long, interesting paper. 2.2d Content and Self-Knowledge [8] ------------------------------- Boghossian, P. 1989. Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17:5-26. We can't know our thought-contents by inference (circular), by introspection (because they're relational), or directly, so we can't know them at all. Brueckner, A. 1990. Scepticism about knowledge of content. Mind 99:447-51. Brueckner, A. 1992. What an anti-individualist knows a priori. Analysis 52:111-18. Contra McKinsey 1991, anti-individualism doesn't lead to a priori knowledge. The knowledge that water is wet doesn't conceptually entail facts about the external world (e.g. H2O), although it may metaphysically necessitate them. Burge, T. 1988. Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85:649-63. Knowledge of our thoughts is compatible with externalism: its content is self-referential and self-verifying. We needn't be able to explicate the content or its enabling conditions, or rule out twin possibilities. Davidson, D. 1987. Knowing one's own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. LePore, E. 1990. Subjectivity and environmentalism. Inquiry 33:197-214. Subjectivism and environmentalism seem to clash on knowledge of content, but it's OK: under environmentalism we still know our contents w/o evidence. McKinsey, M. 1987. Apriorism in the philosophy of language. Philosophical Studies 52:1-32. Argues that we can know the meaning of our words a priori. Analyzes twin earth cases by separating propositional meaning from linguistic meaning, which is indexical, fixes reference, and is knowable a priori. McKinsey, M. 1991. Anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 51:9-16. Contra Burge: if there are conceptual connections between wide contents and and the external world, then we can't know wide contents a priori, as otherwise we could know a priori that the world exists. 2.2e Miscellaneous [15] ------------------ Brown, D.J. 1993. Swampman of La Mancha. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23:327-48. An entertaining fable about a swampthing doppelganger of a murder witness. Does he have content? With plot twists about personal identity. Cummins, R. 1991. Methodological reflections on belief. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Mind and Common Sense_. Cambridge University Press. We shouldn't rely on intuitions about thought-experiments; we need an empirical theory about belief. Belief contents are distinct from sentence contents; we have to distinguish linguistic from psychological semantics. Engel, P. 1987. Functionalism, belief, and content. In (Torrance, ed) _The Mind and the Machine_. Horwood. Gauker, C. 1991. Mental content and the division of epistemic labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:302-18. Heil, J. & Mele, A. 1991. Mental causes. American Philosophical Quarterly 28:61-71. Reconciling Twin Earth with the causal relevance of content. Historical factors can be causally relevant. Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. 1988. Functionalism and broad content. Mind 97:318-400. Should construe functionalism broadly rather than narrowly; then can handle the problem of broad content. Unconvincing. Katz, J. 1990. The domino theory. Philosophical Studies 58:3-39. Anti-intensional arguments are not independent but a series of dominos. Quine/Quine/Davidson/Putnam/Burge rise and fall together. McGinn, C. 1982. The structure of content. In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and Object_. Oxford University Press. Belief content has two distinct elements, one causal-explanatory, the other truth-related. Owens, J. 1987. In defense of a different Doppelganger. Philosophical Review 96:521-54. Owens, J. 1992. Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation. Synthese 90:89-117. Rey, G. 1992. Semantic externalism and conceptual competence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:315-33. Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems. Stalnaker, R.C. 1989. On what's in the head. Philosophical Perspectives 3:287-319. van Gulick, R. 1989. Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work. In (S. Silvers, ed) _ReRepresentation_. Kluwer. Against some arguments for internalism: local causation doesn't imply local type-individuation, as distal relations affect distal causes and effects; and processes can have access to semantic properties via formal properties. Walker, V. 1990. In defense of a different taxonomy: A reply to Owens. Philosophical Review 99. Contra Owens 1987: wide intentional descriptions and molar bodily descriptions don't exhaust the options. A bracketing strategy gives a narrow intentional taxonomy of mental states. Woodfield, A. 1986. Two categories of content. Mind and Language 1:319-54. 2.3 Causal Theories of Content [64] ------------------------------ 2.3a Information-Based Accounts (Dretske, etc) [21] ---------------------------------------------- Barwise, J. & Perry, J. 1983. _Situations and Attitudes_. MIT Press. Barwise, J. 1986. Information and circumstance. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Defending information against Fodor 1986. Information is objective but relational, and depends on the relevant constraints between representation and environment. Circumstances play a vital role. Barwise, J. 1987. Unburdening the language of thought. Mind and Language. Bogdan, R.J. 1988. Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account. Mind and Language. From material (formal) info to semantic info via teleology; from semantic information to representation via internal structure. Cute. With a good reply by Israel, and a terse reply by Dretske. Bogdan, R.J. 1987. Mind, content and information. Synthese. Clark, A. 1993. Mice, shrews, and misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophy 90:290-310. Uses information theory to analyze misrepresentation. A signal represents what it carries most information about, not what it correlates best with. Treating some signals as noise can increase information content. Dretske, F. 1981. _Knowledge and the Flow of Information_. MIT Press. Defines knowledge content is in terms of information-flow from events, and applies to various aspects of psychology. Dretske, F. 1983. Precis of _Knowledge and the Flow of Information_. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:55-90. A summary of the book, with commentary and replies. Dretske, F. 1990. Putting information to work. In (P. Hanson, ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_. University of British Columbia Press. On the causal role of information (as opposed to meaning). Information is causally efficacious if considered with respect to learning. With commentary by Brian Smith. Fodor, J.A. 1986. Information and association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27. Transmission of information is no good without the encoding of information. With criticisms of associative networks, which transmit without encoding, and criticism of Barwise & Perry's account of attunement to a relation. Fodor, J.A. 1987. A situated grandmother. Mind and Language. Foley, R. 1987. Dretske's `information-theoretic' account of knowledge. Synthese. Grandy, R. 1987. Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology and epistemology naturalized. Synthese 70:191-203. Shannon's notion of information is more useful for naturalized epistemology than Dretske's. Israel, D. & Perry, J. 1990. What is information? In (P. Hanson, ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_. University of British Columbia Press. Jackendoff, R. 1985. Information is in the mind of the beholder. Linguistics and Philosophy 8:23-33. Argues that a representationalist theory of semantics beats a realist one. Loewer, B. 1987. From information to intentionality. Synthese. Morris, W. 1990. The regularity theory of information. Synthese 82:375-398. Dretske has problems with ruling out alternative possibilities; and there is a gap between information-caused belief and knowledge. Savitt, S. 1987. Absolute informational content. Synthese 70:185-90. Makes a distinction between absolute information and information that's relative to other knowledge. Sayre, K. 1987. Cognitive science and the problem of semantic content. Synthese 70:247-69. On problems with a computational approach to content: computers process info(t), the non-semantic content of communication theory, not info(s), or semantic content. Get info(s) from efficient processing of mutual info(t). Taylor, K. 1987. Belief, information and semantic content: A naturalist's lament. Synthese 71:97-124. Winograd, T. 1987. Cognition, attunement and modularity. Mind and Language. 2.3b Asymmetric Dependence (Fodor) [11] ---------------------------------- Fodor, J.A. 1987. Meaning and the world order. In _Psychosemantics_. MIT Press. Defends and refines a causal theory, using the notion of asymmetric dependence of a token upon the world. Fodor, J.A. 1990. A theory of content II. In _A Theory of Content_. MIT Press. Defending the asymmetric dependence theory against various objections. Adams, F., Aizawa, K., & Fuller, G. 1992. `X' means X. Minds and Machines. Antony, L. & Levine, J. 1991. The nomic and the robust. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Baker, L.R. 1990. On a causal theory of content. Philosophical Perspectives. Baker, L.R. 1991. Has content been naturalized? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Boghossian, P. 1991. Naturalizing content. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Argues that Fodor's theory is a type-1 theory, requiring naturalistically specifiable circumstances in which a symbol is only caused by its referent; and that these theories fail for various reasons, e.g. verificationism. Cram, H-R. 1992. Fodor's causal theory of representation. Philosophical Quarterly 42:56-70. Fodor's theory has counterexamples and can't explain its counterfactuals; but we can save it by borrowing from Dretske's account of misrepresentation. Loar, B. 1991. Can we explain intentionality? In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Manfredi, P.A. & Summerfield, D.M. 1992. Robustness without asymmetry: A flaw in Fodor's theory of content. Philosophical Studies 66:261-83. 2.3c Causal Accounts, General [9] ----------------------------- Cummins, R. 1989. Representation and covariation. In (S. Silvers, ed) _ReRepresentation_. Kluwer. Fodor, J.A. 1984. Semantics, Wisconsin style. Synthese 59:231-50. Reprinted in _RePresentations_ (MIT Press, 1980). A somewhat sympathetic commentary on the Dretske/Stampe causal theories, but raising the problem of misrepresentation. Fodor, J.A. 1990. Information and representation. In (P. Hanson, ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_. University of British Columbia Press. Godfrey-Smith, P. 1989. Misinformation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19:533-50. On various attempts to solve the error problem and why they don't work. Godfrey-Smith, P. 1991. Signal, decision, action. Journal of Philosophy 88:709-22. World-head reliability is just as important as head-world reliability. With arguments and examples from signal detection theory. McLaughlin, B.P. 1987. What is wrong with correlational psychosemantics. Synthese. Stampe, D. 1977. Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2:42-63. Stampe, D. 1986. Verificationism and a causal account of meaning. Synthese 69:107-37. Warmbrod, K. 1992. Primitive representation and misrepresentation. Topoi 11:89-101. 2.3d Teleological Approaches (Millikan, etc) [23] -------------------------------------------- Agar, N. 1993. What do frogs really believe? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:1-12. Argues that a teleological account can resolve content indeterminacies, by an appeal to counterfactuals in examining what properties were selected for. Dennett, D.C. 1988. Fear of Darwin's optimizing rationale. Manuscript. Defends evolutionary theories of content against Fodor. Dennett, D.C. 1988. Evolution, error and intentionality. In _The Intentional Stance_. MIT Press. Attacks original intentionality (Fodor/Burge/Dretske/Searle/Kripke) -- our intentionality, if anything, is derived through evolution, and so is as indeterminate as that of an artifact. Dretske, F. 1986. Misrepresentation. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form, Content, and Function_. Oxford University Press. Tries to deal with misrepresentation by appealing to function. Fodor, J.A. 1990. Psychosemantics, or, Where do truth conditions come from? In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_. Blackwell. Truth conditions are "entry conditions" for belief under "normal function". Later repudiated. Fodor, J.A. 1990. A theory of content I. In _A Theory of Content_. MIT Press. Teleological solutions can't work, because of underdetermination and so on. Macdonald, G. 1989. Biology and representation. Mind and Language 4:186-200. Matthen, M. 1988. Biological functions and perceptual content. Journal of Philosophy 85:5-27. Millikan, R.G. 1979. An evolutionist approach to language. Philosophy Research Archives 5. Millikan, R.G. 1984. _Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories_. MIT Press. An evolutionary account of thought, content, and various intentional phenomena, appealing to proper functions and adaptational role to individuate contents. Millikan, R.G. 1986. Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95:47-80. The content of a desire is its adaptational Proper Function; the content of a belief is its Normal Condition for success. Millikan, R.G. 1989. Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy 86:281-97. Representation content is determined by the consumption of a representation, not its production. The representation-world correspondence is best taken as a normal condition for the consumer's function. Millikan, R.G. 1989. In defense of proper functions. Philosophy of Science 56:288-302. Millikan, R.G. 1990. Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics. Philosophical Topics 18:151-61. Contrasting positions on the role of representation production and consumption; also on the role of reliability, articulateness, and learning. Millikan, R.G. 1991. Speaking up for Darwin. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. A reply to some of Fodor's criticisms of teleological theories in _Psychosemantics_ and elsewhere. With some remarks on Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory. Millikan, R.G. 1993. _White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice_. MIT Press, A collection of papers on teleological semantics and other issues about psychology and mental content. Newton, N. 1991. Dennett on intrinsic intentionality. Analysis 50:18-23. Contra Dennett 1988, designed creatures can have intrinsic (if not original) intentionality. Overall purpose is dependent on designer's goals, but specific contents need not be. Papineau, D. 1984. Representation and explanation. Philosophy of Science 51:550-72. A teleological theory of belief/desire contents: the satisfaction conditions for a desire are those effects for which it was selected; truth conditions for a belief are circumstances resulting in satisfaction of desires. Papineau, D. 1990. Truth and teleology. In (D. Knowles, ed) _Explanation and its Limits_. Cambridge University Press. Best theory is combination of a success-guaranteeing account of truth-conditions with a teleological account of desire. Papineau, D. 1991. Teleology and mental states. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65. Pickles, D. 1989. Intentionality, representation, and function. Sussex University, Cognitive Science Research Paper 140. Combining the analysis-relative and historical accounts of function, and using these to give an account of intentionality: representation are produced by conditional productive functions. Argues against Fodor on indeterminacy. Pietrowski, P.M. 1992. Intentionality and teleological error. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73:267-82. Millikan's theory has an implausible consequence: creatures' belief contents can involve properties which they cannot discriminate. With examples. Shapiro, L. 1992. Darwin and disjunction: Foraging theory and univocal assignments of content. Philosophy of Science Association Vol. 1. 2.4 Conceptual Role Semantics [13] ----------------------------- Block, N. 1986. Advertisement for a semantics for psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:615-78. An in-depth program for conceptual-role semantics, and its role in a two-factor account of meaning. Also a defense of narrow content. Block, N. 1988. Functional role and truth conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181. A defence of functional role semantics, and an account of its relation to truth-conditional factors. A two-factor theory will handle wide content. Cummins, R. 1992. Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content. Philosophical Studies 65:103-127. CRS conflates representation content and attitude content (which depends on a representation's "target"), so can't handle representation content; it makes all content-based explanations vacuous; and it can't handle error properly. Field, H. 1977. Logic, meaning, and conceptual role. Journal of Philosophy 74:379-409. Explicates conceptual role in terms of conditional probability, and analyzes meaning as conceptual role plus reference. With remarks on truth, descriptions, and synonymy. Field, H. 1978. Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13:9-61. Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1991. Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role. Mind and Language 6:328-43. Conceptual role semantics isn't compatible with compositional semantics and the denial of an analytic/synthetic distinction, as full conceptual roles aren't compositional, and there's no way to specify a relevant subset. Harman, G. 1974. Meaning and semantics. In (M. Munitz & P. Unger, eds) _Semantics and Philosophy_. New York University Press. Harman, G. 1975. Language, thought, and communication. In (K. Gunderson, ed) _Language, Mind, and Knowledge_. University of Minnesota Press. Harman, G. 1982. Conceptual role semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28:242-56. Meaning and content is determined by the role of symbols in thought (e.g. inference and perception). With remarks on indeterminacy, context-dependence, the linguistic division of labor, qualia, speech acts, and more. Loar, B. 1982. Conceptual role and truth conditions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:272-83. On the relation between conceptual role and truth-conditions. Contra Harman, truth-conditions are to an extent independent of conceptual role. Loewer, B. 1982. The role of `Conceptual role semantics'. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:305-15. Contra Harman 1982, truth-conditions are central to a semantic theory. Silverberg, A. 1992. Putnam on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 67:111-31. Argues against Putnam 1987 that conceptual role plays an important role in determining meaning. Appeals to the induction theory of Holland et al. Warfield, T.A. 1993. On a semantic argument against conceptual role semantics. Analysis 53:298-304. Contra Fodor and Lepore, meanings can be compositional even if inferential roles are not, as long as meanings only supervene on inferential role. 2.5 Representation (General) [18] ---------------------------- Chomsky, N. 1980. Rules and representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:1-61. Cummins, R. 1986. Inexplicit information. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_. University of Arizona Press. On various kinds of representation of knowledge or belief without explicit tokens: control-implicit, domain-implicit, and procedural information. The key distinction is representation vs. execution of a rule. Dretske, F. 1986. Aspects of cognitive representation. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_. University of Arizona Press. On the reference and content of representations. Reference is determined by causation; content, i.e. representation "as", is determined by functional role, when functioning normally in natural habitat. Fodor, J.A. 1986. Why paramecia don't have mental representations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:3-23. Because paramecia can't respond to non-nomic properties of the stimulus. Perceptual categories vs. sensory manifolds. Gillett, G. 1989. Representations and cognitive science. Inquiry 32:261-77. Goldman, A. 1986. Constraints on representation. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_. University of Arizona Press. Hatfield, G. 1989. Computation, representation and content in noncognitive theories of perception. In (S. Silvers, ed) _ReRepresentation_. Kluwer. Jackendoff, R. 1991. The problem of reality. Nous 25:411-33. On the philosophical (inward-out) vs. psychological (outward-in) approaches to the mind-world relation; the psychological approach is more useful in understanding representation. Internal reality is an imperfect construction. Kirsh, D. 1990. When is information explicitly represented? In (P. Hanson, ed) _Information, Language and Cognition_. University of British Columbia Press. Kukla, R. 1992. Cognitive models and representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43:219-32. Lloyd, D. 1987. Mental representation from the bottom up. Synthese 70:23-78. Lycan, W.G. 1989. Ideas of representation. In (Weissbord, ed) _Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E.M. Adams_. Ridgeview. Matthews, R.J. 1984. Troubles with representationalism. Social Research 51:1065-97. Richardson, R.C. 1981. Internal representation: Prologue to a theory of intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:171-212. Shanon, B. 1991. Representation -- senses and reasons. Philosophical Psychology. On different senses of "representation" -- external, experiential, mental locus, substrate of meaning, mediating functions, technical-psychological. Sober, E. 1976. Mental representations. Synthese 33:101-48. Skokowski, P.G. 1994. Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"? Minds and Machines 4. Cummins' account of inexplicit information fails, as even "executed" rules must be represented in the system. With remarks on the Chinese room. van Gulick, R. 1982. Mental representation: A functionalist view. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:3-20. On the distinction between representation and representation-use. 2.6 The Explanatory Role of Content [10] ----------------------------------- Adams, F. 1991. Causal contents. In (B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his Critics_. Blackwell. On Dretske's account of the causal role of content. Addresses some objections: Dennett's worries about intrinsic intentionality, Fodor's about external causal powers, and some worries about syntax. Bogdan, R.J. 1989. Does semantics run the psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49:687-700. A critique of Fodor. Semantics per se doesn't cause. Also, Fodor's is an account of the what, not the how, of semantics. Somewhat bizarre. Cummins, R. 1991. Mental meaning in psychological explanation. In (B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his Critics_. Blackwell. Criticizes Dretske's account of the role of content, especially because of its dependence on an organism's history; also, it may not cohere with work in cognitive science. Argues for an interpretational, not a causal account. Devitt, M. 1991. Why Fodor can't have it both ways. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Dretske, F. 1987. The explanatory role of content. In (R. Grimm & D. Merrill, eds) _Contents of Thought_. University of Arizona Press. Content must explain why (not how) an internal state caused a certain output. The explanation is given in terms of what a state has historically indicated. With thermostats and sea-snails as examples. Comments by Cummins, and reply. Dretske, F. 1988. _Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes_. MIT Press. Fodor, J.A. 1986. Banish DisContent. In (J. Butterfield, ed) _Language, Mind, and Logic_. Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Horgan, T. 1991. Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content. In (B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his Critics_. Blackwell. Distinguishes three problems of mental causation (extrinsic factors, exclusion of the nonphysical, anomalism). Criticizes Dretske's theory (can't handle unlearnt or here-and-now reasons), offers a counterfactual account. Perry, J. & Israel, D. 1991. Fodor and psychological explanation. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics_. Blackwell. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1987. What's in a mind? Synthese 70:97-122. We must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function, as we need representation to capture generalizations about behavior; particularly due to the information-sensitivity and stimulus-independence of behavior. 2.7 Mental Content, Misc [26] ------------------------ Bogdan, R.J. 1986. The manufacture of belief. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form, Content, and Function_. Oxford University Press. Boghossian, P.A. 1994. Inferential-role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction. No matter how we understand the denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the falsity of inferential-role semantics does not follow. The meaning-constitutive inferences needn't be the analytic inferences. Churchland, P.M. & Churchland, P.S. 1983. Stalking the wild epistemic engine. Nous 17:5-18. On "translational" (conceptual) and "calibrational" (referential) content. Relation of content issues to computational issues. Cummins, R. 1989. _Meaning and Mental Representation_. MIT Press. Critiques other views, offers interpretational semantics. Cummins, R. 1991. Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: A response to Morris. Minds and Machines 1:31-42. Morris 1991 is wrong: formal individuation is easy, and objectively determinate content isn't needed. External grounding is also irrelevant. Dennett, D.C. 1991. Ways of establishing harmony. In (B. McLaughlin, ed) _Dretske and his Critics_. Blackwell. On the ways in which meanings can come to cohere with their causal roles: learning, natural selection, and design. Criticizes Dretske for undervaluing the latter two: all three are in the same boat. Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1992. _Holism: A Shopper's Guide_. Blackwell. Rebutting arguments for meaning holism: those based on confirmation holism (Quine), normativity of interpretation (Davidson, Dennett, Lewis), and functional-role semantics (Block, Field, Churchland). Fodor, J.A. & LePore, E. 1993. Precis of _Holism: A Shopper's Guide_. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:637-682. A discussion of _Holism_ with comments by Devitt, Rey, McLaughlin, Brandom, and Churchland, and a reply by Fodor and Lepore. Haugeland, J. 1990. The Intentionality All-Stars. Philosophical Perspectives 4:383-427. Intentionality around the diamond: neoCartesianism, neobehaviorism, neopragmatism. 1B=Fodor/Pylyshyn, 2B=Dennett/Quine, 3B=Heidegger/Sellars. SS=Wittgenstein. RF=Searle, CF=Skinner, LF=Rorty/Derrida. Lots of fun. Kukla, A. & Kukla, R. 1989. Meaning holism and intentional psychology. Analysis 173-53. Contra Fodor, meaning holism is compatible with intentional psychology. Most psychological generalizations quantify over contents, rather than appealing to specific contents. Lehrer, K. 1986. Metamind: Belief, consciousness and intentionality. In (R. Bogdan, ed) _Belief: Form, Content, and Function_. Oxford University Press. Lycan, W.G. 1986. Thoughts about things. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, ed) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_. University of Arizona Press. Madell, G. 1989. Physicalism and the content of thought. Inquiry 32:107-21. Maloney, J.C. 1989. _The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language_. Cambridge University Press. McGinn, C. 1989. _Mental Content_. Blackwell. Morris, M. 1991. Why there are no mental representations. Minds and Machines 1:1-30. There can be no non-stipulative content to non-semantically individuated tokens. Mostly a critique of Cummins; also Fodor and Dennett. Peacocke, C. 1986. _Thoughts: An Essay on Content_. Blackwell. Perry, J. 1994. Fodor and Lepore on holism. Philosophical Studies 73:123-58. The argument from anatomism and the failure of the analytic/synthetic distinction to holism fails. On the many different interpretations of holism and anatomism: there is a reasonable molecularist position. Pollock, J. 1990. Understanding the language of thought. Philosophical Studies 58:95-120. Remarks on a number of aspects of mental content -- narrow, propositional, qualitative -- with respect to functionalism and the language of thought. With comments by Baker. Schiffer, S. 1981. Truth and the theory of content. In (H. Parret, ed) _Meaning and Understanding_. Berlin. Schiffer, S. 1987. _Remnants of Meaning_. MIT Press. Senor, T.D. 1992. Two-factor theories, meaning holism, and intentionalistic psychology: A reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5:133-51. Stalnaker, R. 1991. How to do semantics for the language of thought. In (B. Loewer & G. Rey, eds) _Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics_. Blackwell. On some tensions in Fodor's view of content: e.g. narrow content must be dependent on functional role, which seems to lead to holism. The role of denotational semantics as a defense is unclear. Sterelny, K. 1990. _The Representational Theory of Mind_. Blackwell. Stich, S.P. 1982. On the ascription of content. In (A. Woodfield, ed) _Thought and Object_. Oxford University Press. On the tacit theories underlying the folk psychology of belief: beliefs are states associated with typical causal patterns. With remarks on ambiguity, content identity and similarity, and environmental dependence. Stich, S.P., and Lawrence, S. 1993. Intentionality and naturalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Argues that a failure to "naturalize" intentionality won't lead to disasters such as irrealism, irrelevance, or non-science, whether naturalization is understood as analysis, property identity, supervenience, or whatever. -- Compiled by David Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, Washington University. (c) 1994 David J. Chalmers.